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ABSTRACT 
 
COMBATING BUDGETARY COMPLICATIONS FROM THE MARCELLUS 
SHALE: THE CASE FOR A PENNSYLVANIA GAS FUND 
 
 
 
By  
Daniel R. Thompson, II 
May 2013 
 
Thesis supervised by Kent Moors  
The relationship between shale gas development and budgetary and 
microeconomic externalities was studied. The extraction activity in the Barnett shale 
formation provided a case study for assessing per-well highway infrastructure damage 
and water usage. The creation of a predictive model based upon the Barnett was applied 
to the Marcellus formation. The results showed support for the hypothesis that shale gas 
development creates negative externalities that amount to unfunded mandates and free-
rider problems for states and localities. Implications and policy solutions, including the 
case for a Pennsylvania natural gas fund, are discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Western Pennsylvania stands on the cusp of a growing wave of economic and 
energy development that will prove every bit as monumental and inescapable as the 
Spindletop strike. Pennsylvania rests at the epicenter of Marcellus shale gas development, 
arguably the largest unconventional natural gas reserve on the planet. As Pennsylvania 
quickly adjusts to the new realities of having the state of its economy dictated by the 
economics of resource extraction, the population will likewise need to understand, 
manage, and mitigate the negative side effects of this extraction economy. If the state 
government and policy makers do not prepare for these issues while Marcellus 
production is still in its infancy, they will find these problems particularly difficult to 
address in a reactive manner.  
Many other states and nations have found themselves in a similar position – 
possessing substantial mineral wealth which, when extracted, created the environment 
that could potentially be impacted by price volatility, several types of inflation, and other 
economic problems. Some have elected to establish what have been referred to in oil and 
gas producing nations as oil funds, or more generally, natural resource funds (NRFs).  
Such funds act as fiscal policy tools to support long-term management of resource 
revenue. In Norway, for example, revenues from petroleum extraction are transferred into 
the fund and then invested abroad, ―to avoid overheating the Norwegian economy and to 
shield it from the effects of oil price fluctuations…. The aim is to have a diversified 
investment mix that will give the highest possible risk-adjusted return within the 
guidelines set by the [Ministry of Finance]‖ (―Government Pension Fund Global‖). 
  2 
Energy has always been a critical component of political and economic concerns, 
at all government levels.  Concerns about energy factor directly or indirectly into almost 
all political or economic issues. With Pennsylvania‘s position over the bulk of the 
Marcellus shale formation, and the debate over the extraction of this energy source 
quickly heating up, research on this topic in real-time can be valuable both for the policy 
makers involved in the debate and the citizens of Pennsylvania. 
Thus far, the debate over developing the Marcellus shale formation (MSF)
1
 has 
been limited to a debate between the pro-development/pro-business lobby and the 
environmental lobby. Most people on both sides of the debate agree on many of the 
overall likely economic benefits.
2
 However, the negative economic externalities have not 
been fully considered. Because of this oversight in addressing inflation and volatility, 
determining a way to deal with these issues has not been addressed. This thesis aims to 
address the development of negative economic externalities like the Dutch Disease, 
sectoral inflation, micro-inflation, and price volatility, as well as the destruction of non-
related industries. This thesis will explore how these problems can be managed and 
mitigated effectively by the creation of a natural resource fund.  
                                                        
1
 The Marcellus shale formation is a large underground shale deposit from which 
considerable amounts of natural gas will likely be extracted. More specific information 
about this is provided later in this work. 
2
 Notable exceptions include people concerned about eco-tourism, particularly from the 
perspective of water quality. Particularly on more localized levels, the loss of eco-tourism 
commerce could be devastating (Delaware Riverkeeper). 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Relevant Literature 
2.1 The Shift from Oil to Gas: Current Trends and Issues  
 
 Oil has been the dominant fuel for modern economic development for over a 
century. The metaphorical engine of oil development began to roar in earnest with the 
advent of the oil-fueled British Navy at the behest of the Admiral John Fischer. Since that 
point in the early 20
th
 century, oil has been both the fulcrum and the nexus of world 
geopolitics, dominating warfare, finance, commerce, and industry like no other 
commodity or good has done before or since.  
 However, such dominance has come at a hefty price. The developed world is now 
completely dependent upon oil and oil-based products. The result is a dwindling supply 
both at home and abroad, despite ever-increasing demand. In fact, with the entrance of  
commercially- and industrially awakened China and India, there is simply not enough oil 
to keep up with the exploding demand of so many major consumers.  
 Enter natural gas. Long an alternative of oil, natural gas has nevertheless 
remained less than ideal for a number of reasons. However, the desirability of natural gas 
has increased as the price of oil has steadily increased, and will continue to do so. This 
increase in demand has driven, and will continue to drive, new development in 
exploration and production as time moves forward.  
  4 
2.1.1 Declining Worldwide Oil Production 
Many energy commentators, beginning with L. King Hubbard over 50 years ago, 
have predicted the coming of Peak Oil.
3
  Tony Eriksen, a commentator on the Peak Oil 
phenomenon, estimates that the world has already reached peak production. According to 
him, ―[w]orld production peaked in 2008 at 81.73 million barrels/day (mbd).‖4 
While few deny the existence of Peak Oil,
5
 opinions vary as to the real 
importance of it and the gravity of the situation. However, the Peak Oil debate illustrates 
the tangible pressure within the market to move away from oil as the primary fuel for the 
United States‘ economy, whether due to the reality of Peak Oil as a real problem or as 
part of the natural innovation process away from oil as a primary fuel. While it remains 
unlikely that such a shift will occur abruptly, this increasing pressure will prompt more 
                                                        
3 Peak oil is a concept that originated with the now-deceased M. King Hubbert, an 
American geophysicist who worked for Shell Oil Company. His aggregate 
production/depletion curve, known commonly as the Hubbert curve, was based on the 
now widely accepted premise that world oil supply is finite. With it, he correctly 
predicted peak production in the United States. 
4
 Eriksen continues in his discussion of world peak oil: ―This oil definition includes crude 
oil, lease condensate, oil sands and natural gas plant liquids. If natural gas plant liquids 
are excluded, then the production peak remains in 2008 but at 73.79 mbd. However, if oil 
sands are also excluded then crude oil and lease condensate production peaked in 2005 at 
72.75 mbd…. Non-OPEC oil production peaked in 2004 and is forecast to decline at a 
faster rate in 2009 and beyond due mainly to big declines from Russia, Norway, the UK 
and Mexico. OPEC has the ability to increase production later this year and in early 2010. 
Although key OPEC producer Saudi Arabia peaked in 2005, it probably has sustainable 
annual surplus capacity of 1mbd. Iraq and possibly Nigeria also have potential to increase 
production but these countries continue to have serious internal conflicts. By the time 
2011 arrives, OPEC will not have the ability to offset cumulative non-OPEC declines and 
world oil production is forecast to stay below its 2008 peak‖ (Eriksen). 
5
 The primary exception to this acceptance of the existence of peak oil resides in the 
debate over the existence of abiotic, or abiogenic, oil production. This theory, originally 
German in origin, gained considerable renown in Russia, particularly under the Soviet 
Union, as a result of writings by Dmitri Mendeleev and a number of subsequent Soviet 
geologists. The theory has generally fallen out of favor, particularly in the West, due to 
the theory‘s inability to predict locations of new oil deposits. 
  5 
development in natural gas production worldwide. This can already be witnessed in 
China, as the country has recently begun preliminary planning and development of its 
own shale gas resources (―China‖), in partnership with American companies and the US 
government (―US-China‖). The resulting shift will likely cause increased pressure and 
price volatility in natural gas prices due to newer and potentially cheaper-to-develop gas 
deposits coming online. This translates to greater budgetary and economic pressures 
elsewhere, particularly in places that rely heavily on royalties or revenues from natural 
gas extraction.   
2.1.2 Unconventional Natural Gas Boom in the United States 
 The gas industry has taken a keen interest in shale gas formations for a number of 
reasons. The advent of directional drilling (also known as horizontal drilling)
6
 and 
hydraulic fracturing (more commonly referred to as hydro-fracking, or fracking) have 
made natural gas extraction from shale rock formations economically viable. As a result, 
costs of extracting the natural gas have plummeted relative to other unconventional 
natural gas plays
7
 like tight gas, coal-bed methane, and undersea methane hydrate 
deposits.  
 The second development relates to the price of natural gas. As it has risen 
over the past few years (despite its recent hovering in the mid-single digits in 
                                                        
6
 Directional drilling ―involves steering a downhole drill bit in a direction other 
than vertical. An initially vertical drillhole is slowly turned 90 degrees to 
penetrate long horizontal distances, sometimes over a mile, through… bedrock. 
Hydraulic fractures are then created into the rock at intervals from the horizontal 
section of the borehole, allowing a substantial number of high-permeability 
pathways to contact a large volume of rock‖ (Soeder and Kappel ―Updated‖). 
7
 A play is defined as either ―the extent of a petroleum-bearing formation‖ or ―the 
activities associated with petroleum development in an area‖ (―Natural Gas Play 
Definition‖); though it is used in both oil and gas industries.  
 
  6 
dollar terms per contract), the overall financial viability and profitability of 
unconventional gas development has increased.  Because the wellhead prices of 
gas have risen ―from values of less than $2.00 per MCF (thousand cubic feet) in 
the 1980s to a peak of $10.82 per MCF in the summer of 2008‖ (―EIA – Natural 
Gas Pipeline Network‖), it is now financially feasible to expect a return on the 
capital investment needed for unconventional gas development. Even with the 
decline in prices due to the 2009 economic downturn, they are still substantially 
higher than a decade earlier (Soeder and Kappel ―Water Resources‖). 
The energy market in the United States has already witnessed substantial 
unconventional gas development in both shale gas (the Barnett and Haynesville 
plays are the most mature
8
) and coal bed methane (the Powder River Basin
9
 is by 
far the largest in the United States) relative to the rest of the world. This trend 
simply reflects the overall international trends, as the popularity of 
unconventional gas development increases, particularly in Europe and China.  
2.1.3 United States as Net Natural Gas Exporter 
Until recently, the Canadian natural gas industry, as well as the natural gas 
industry at large, had been gearing up for the projected increase in the importation of 
natural gas into the United States. Most observers had been predicting a gradual but 
sustained move away from oil and toward natural gas for many uses in the U.S., along 
with steady but substantial increases in demand of natural gas as a bridging fuel that such 
a shift would likely entail. These projections were due in large part to the 
                                                        
8
 The Barnett shale formation is located in north-central Texas and the Haynesville shale 
formation in northwest Louisiana/east Texas. More information about both formations is 
discussed later on in this section. 
9
 The Powder River Basin is located in southeast Montana and northeast Wyoming.  
  7 
acknowledgement that the U.S. conventional natural gas production had already peaked 
as of 2001 (Gilardoni), as well as a dearth of economically viable replacement supply to 
make up the difference.  
For the foreseeable future, natural gas will be a key energy source for the 
developed and developing world. This is already the case for Europe. According to one 
source, between 60% and 90% Europe‘s natural needs must be imported from non-
European nations, particularly Russia. Unlike Europe, which has considerably fewer and 
poorer sources of conventional natural gas, as well as smaller and less-developed 
unconventional natural gas plays, the US could conceivably become a net exporter of 
natural gas. 
To that point, the Kitimat Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facility had originally been 
tasked as an import point for LNG into North America – particularly for markets in the 
U.S. However, since that time technology has progressed to the point that ―[t]he 
Department of Energy now predicts that shale gas could meet half America‘s demand 
within two decades and turn the country into a net exporter‖ (Fortson). As a result, 
Kitimat is being refitted as an export facility (Vanderklippe). This new development, 
something as simple as re-tasking a LNG facility from importing to exporting, signals a 
sea change in the future of North American natural gas production, and the world natural 
gas market as a whole.  
The potential for continued linkage between oil and gas should be of grave 
concern for any policymaker basing his or her budgetary projections upon proceeds 
related to the market price of natural gas.  
  8 
2.1.4 The Role of Natural Gas in Future United States’ Energy Needs 
Oil has clearly dominated the energy markets of the world for decades. Indeed, oil 
will likely continue to do so for much of the foreseeable future. However, that dominance 
of the world energy markets will be for slightly different reasons moving forward than it 
has been in the past. Until now, oil has dominated the world energy markets as a direct 
result of how plentiful, fungible, transportable, and relatively cheap it has remained for 
decades. However, oil‘s destructive effect on the energy markets will be a direct result of 
oil having become the hydrocarbon of choice the world over (Moors). Due to oil‘s 
ubiquity in both energy uses (particularly transportation and industrial uses) and as a 
financial commodity in its own right, the price of oil has become considerably more 
difficult to predict. Such price volatility will necessitate consumers, where possible, to 
change to other, more stably-priced hydrocarbon products, especially for transportation 
uses. Despite oil‘s hitherto relative price-inelasticity10 in the transportation market, there 
have been signs that such price-inelasticity has rather defined limits, and that those limits 
will be reached in the near future.
11
 Moreover, this view has become more common as 
time has gone on, leading many to call for more reliable (and more domestic) supplies of 
energy. Dr. Timothy Considine, former professor at the Pennsylvania State University 
and now professor at University of Wyoming, states that ―[n]atural gas is widely viewed 
as a bridge between the age of oil and the next energy paradigm, perhaps based upon 
                                                        
10
 Price elasticity of demand refers to the responsiveness of aggregate demand to changes 
in price when all other factors are held constant. 
11
 This was witnessed when gasoline prices reached $4-$5/gallon in 2008. The effect of 
this price point seemed to carry a ―psychological effect‖ that numerous economists and 
observers noted at the time. As prices approach, and in some areas surpass this price 
point again, some predict a similar chilling effect on the overall economy again. The 
debate is still open as to whether this will occur or not (Gelsi).  
  9 
some combination of nuclear, solar, wind, and biomass resources…. By developing 
domestic natural gas resources here in the United States, greater energy import 
dependency and higher trade deficits could be avoided. Liquid fuel imports also could be 
displaced if these new natural gas resources could be utilized in transportation‖ 
(Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 2). 
2.1.5 Positive Effects of Natural Resource Development 
According to the 2009 Considine report, ―An Emerging Giant: Prospects and 
Economic Impacts of Developing the Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Play,‖ Pennsylvania 
has already begun to experience benefits that are merely the beginning of greater 
improvements on the horizon. Considine noted that Pennsylvanians should expect 
substantial increases in employment across numerous sectors of the economy, as well as 
substantial increases in net tax inflows. Considering the hemorrhaging of jobs that 
Pennsylvania has experienced since most of its heavy industry left several decades ago 
(steel, iron, coke, etc.), development of the MSF is seen as a panacea to local and state 
policymakers.  Both the remittance of funds generated by the pending severance tax on 
gas extraction and the increase in industry, commerce, and employment due to the MSF 
development will vastly improve Pennsylvania‘s economy. 
The basis of the state‘s optimistic outlook with respect to the Marcellus – centered 
on economic benefits, taxes and jobs – correctly indicate a critical piece of understanding 
regarding shale development. While some benefits will be felt primarily on the local 
level, particularly the increase in employment, the overall benefits will tend to more 
generally apply themselves throughout the state. Philadelphia, for example, will 
  10 
undoubtedly enjoy many of the positive externalities
12
 of the MSF development despite 
having no shale beneath it and as a result remaining relatively unscathed by the local 
problems with development.
13
 
The 2009 Considine report, as well as the subsequent report published in 
2010, are supportive of MSF development and its benefits to Pennsylvania and 
urge caution with potentially short-sighted taxation or regulation. According to 
Considine, natural gas development is a highly competitive industry that is 
extremely vulnerable to natural gas volatility. This has been seen in the Barnett, 
particularly from 2008 onward, when new well-drilling activity peaked. 
Considine‘s report recommended that Pennsylvania should minimize both 
taxation and regulation so as to maximize economic activity stemming from 
Marcellus development. That report contends that a ―larger industry in the long 
run will be a far greater generator of government tax revenues than an industry 
stunted by high taxes or costly regulations‖ (Considine et al. ―An Emerging 
Giant‖ 3). While these authors are promoting an extremely industry-friendly 
environment, a long-term view is needed so as to not have companies dictate 
terms to governments or the general population. The aim of economic policy from 
the standpoint of a state (or national) government should focus on sustainable 
                                                        
12
 Some of these positive externalities may be in the form of potentially lower natural gas 
prices and greater business activity resulting from those lower prices.  The potentially 
lower prices will be the result of proximity to supply, as well as being part of the 
northeast U.S. corridor. Most of the natural gas from Marcellus development will likely 
be piped east to fulfill demand from New York City to Washington, D.C. 
13
 It should be noted that while Philadelphia will likely be relatively negatively affected 
by shale gas development, this should not imply that the eastern reaches of the state will 
be completely unscathed. Refer to the discussion of watershed and eco-tourism later in 
the work. 
  11 
growth, rather than promoting the type of boom and-bust cycles that tend to 
eviscerate the economic viability of other industries at the expense of an 
extractive one. Considine‘s point above makes it clear that such negative 
attendant effects rarely receive any attention. From the extant literature, few 
researchers have addressed the possibility that a state within a larger nation might 
not benefit from extractive industry. 
There are a number of reasons why the positive economic effects of development 
are generally addressed more often by researchers. One of the biggest reasons is that 
positive economic factors of MSF development tend to be easier to study. There tends to 
be a considerable amount of data available for such research. One example can be found 
in the following quotation from the 2009 Considine report:  
A more meaningful estimate of economic impacts is value added, which 
subtracts inter-industry purchases from gross output and measures the 
returns to labor and capital. Using this measure, the Marcellus gas industry 
in Pennsylvania directly added $1.1 billion to the economy of 
Pennsylvania, which then generated indirect and induced impacts that 
increased the total value added generated in the Commonwealth by $2.3 
billion. In other words, the total economic impact of the Marcellus 
industry measured by valued added was $2.3 billion during calendar year 
2008 (Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 24). 
 
Without doubt, the development of the MSF will create many economic winners, as has 
already been witnessed in places like Washington and Bradford counties,
14
 where the 
bulk of development in Pennsylvania has occurred thus far.  
                                                        
14
 Washington and Bradford Counties have been the early epicenters of Marcellus shale 
development, particularly in Pennsylvania. Washington County is located southwest of 
Pittsburgh, on the border with West Virginia. The county seat of Washington County, 
Washington, PA, is approximately equidistant between Pittsburgh, PA and Wheeling, 
WV (―Washington County‖). Bradford County is located along the northern border of 
Pennsylvania with New York State. Its county seat is Towanda, PA, which is located 
almost due south of Sayre, PA (―Welcome to Bradford County‖). 
  12 
Many of the so-called ―winners‖ of Marcellus shale development have been 
farmers and landowners, many of whom have struggled for decades to simply tread 
financial water to avoid insolvency and bank repossession of their farmlands. Through 
royalty payments and leasing proceeds, many of these people have managed to turn tidy 
profits and become relatively well-off, particularly when compared to their neighbors. 
Thanks to the experiences of these landowners, as well as published studies both by 
academia (Considine‘s work exemplifies this) and industry in general,15 the case for 
developing MSF quickly has been made very strongly. Little attention has been paid to 
the likely negative economic externalities associated with MSF development. 
2.1.6 The Negative Effects of Development 
As natural gas is extracted from the MSF, the state of Pennsylvania will begin to 
become more and more dependent upon revenue and economic activity directly resulting 
from resource extraction. Table 1 addresses these issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15
 Range Resources, in particular, has been at the forefront of putting a positive spin on 
the Marcellus development. This has been aided greatly by the efforts of the Marcellus 
Shale Coalition, essentially an industry front-group that has effectively lobbied to both 
maximize shale gas development as well as minimizing regulation and taxation. More 
information can be found on their website (―Marcellus Shale Coalition‖) as well as an 
opposing website (―Marcellus Shale Coalition – Source Watch‖).  
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Table 1. Potential Policy Issues Related to Resource Extraction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Few if any of the above problems solely affect a single subject. Oftentimes, these 
effects can be difficult to unpack or disentangle from one another, as they may present 
sympathetic or mutually enabling problems or synergistic relationships that worsen the 
overall negative effects. Indeed, only by addressing them all at once can policymakers 
hope to truly and effectively mitigate the negative attendant effects of natural resource 
extraction. 
2.1.6.1 Negative Environmental Externalities  
Hydrocarbon development of all types inexorably leads to water pollution. The 
flowback water
16
 from the shale gas drilling will potentially contain a number of potential 
                                                        
16
 ―Flowback water (aka backflow water) is the murky, salty water from fracking natural 
gas wells. It consists of frac fluid which returns to the surface (aka the frac load 
recovery) as well as produced water. This water contains clay, dirt, metals, chemicals and 
even diesel that may have been added‖ (―Flowback water‖). 
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pollutants, including but not limited to salts, sand, acids (hydrochloric, sulfuric), 
bromides, thorium, uranium, radium, sulfides, pyrite, chlorides, zinc, chromium, 
molybdenum, cobalt, arsenic, vanadium, nickel, chromium, barium, calcium, iron, 
magnesium, manganese, and strontium, and calcium carbonate (CaCO3).
17
 Any of these 
substances can prove to be deadly in their own right.  The Dunkard Creek fish kill of 
2009
18
, for example, demonstrates the potential for a single moderate to large spill to 
impact the environment. However, the state Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP) can, in theory, mitigate this damage.  
Generally, well-site spillage has traditionally represented the greatest source of 
water pollution in shale gas drilling. However, the state has already begun to take 
regulatory and oversight action to curb spillage pollution. In this way, DEP is currently 
addressing the largest and most obvious point sources of groundwater pollution.
19
 
However, this leaves another source of environmental pollution unaddressed. 
The long-term effects of fracking remain a bit of a mystery, even to geo-physicists 
and geologists. No one is completely sure what a frack actually does, short of creating 
                                                        
17
 The Democratic members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce recently 
released a report that identifies many of the chemicals found in fracwater (―Chemicals‖).  
18
 Dunkard Creek, which straddles the Pennsylvania/West Virginia border, experienced a 
massive fish kill in September 2009 along thirty miles of its length. Golden algae 
bloomed in the creek as a result of ―low, warm creek flows and high levels of chlorides 
and dissolved solids…[which] were high because of discharges from a mine treatment 
facility at Consol Energy's Blacksville No. 2 deep mine and a second treatment facility at 
Consol's Loveridge deep mine near the West Virginia town of St. Leo. Another 
contributing cause… could be what [was] described as a discharge from a new borehole 
into which an unspecified company is injecting drilling wastewater into a mine void‖ 
(Hopey). 
19
 One of the major environmental issues that should be addressed more directly is the 
interstate/cross-border effect of shale gas development. This is a particularly salient issue 
in light of New York State‘s moratorium on new shale gas development, and West 
Virginia‘s and Ohio‘s relative lack of development when compared to the development in 
Pennsylvania. 
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micro-fissures within the underlying shale formation, thereby releasing the captured gas. 
The development of fracking technology and the use of this technique in the field have 
led to numerous problems, such as micro-earthquakes
20
, destruction and adulteration of 
underground aquifers and groundwater, and water pollution in the form of flowback 
water and spillage.  Even without these specific problems, the development is considered 
heavy industry, and there is generally a localized resultant destruction and degradation of 
transportation infrastructure and noise pollution, as well as a considerably greater volume 
of traffic. All of these issues either directly or indirectly affect the localities where the 
development occurs. Then there are the economic problems, which can lead to such 
issues as an overall loss of jobs (mostly in completely unrelated sectors), skilled labor 
shortages, and slower overall economic growth.
21
 
2.1.6.2 Infrastructure Degradation 
 The development of practically any extractive industry dramatically increases the 
load that local infrastructure must bear. Shale gas development is not an exception. The 
equipment necessary to drill and frack the formation, water transport trucks for the initial 
fracking process, and the trucks necessary for subsequent disposal of the effluent water 
must make seemingly countless trips at each drilling location. This greatly increased 
traffic leads directly to accelerated road degradation. It does so rather quickly because 
                                                        
20
 Hydrofrack-induced micro-earthquakes have been noted since at least as far back as 
1982 (Keppler et al.). More recent anecdotal evidence (―Fracking‖) refers to considerably 
more frequent micro-quakes. Another, more official, record can be found at a site 
maintained by the Arkansas Geological Survey (AGS) (―Earthquakes‖). 
21
 The problems mentioned here generally are considered to be associated with Dutch 
disease/resource curse phenomena. These issues are discussed in greater detail later in 
this work. 
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most drills are located in rural areas and those local roads were not generally designed to 
service heavy industry traffic.
22
  
2.1.6.3 Commodity Price Volatility 
When nations or states base their budgets upon the vagaries of the commodities 
markets, the result is generally rather predictable. As Tsalik and Ebel tersely point out, 
―Price volatility makes budget planning difficult‖ (Tsalik and Ebel 5). When a 
government expands services based on expanded revenues from higher commodity 
prices, the budget rarely takes into account the inevitable revenue decline. The result 
generally leads to a subsequent elimination or curtailing of the originally expanded 
service (ibid). This can lead to all manner of political and economic difficulties. 
Between the volatility of the actual price of natural gas and competition from both 
domestic and foreign sources of natural gas, governments in natural gas producing areas 
will come under dramatic pressures with which the policymakers there have little, if any, 
experience.  
2.1.6.4 Resource curse/Dutch Disease 
 Another troublesome problem that resource-extraction-dependent states and 
nations suffer has become known by a number of monikers, some referring to the entire 
problem, and others referring to a small portion thereof. While contemporary scholarship 
identifies both ‗resource curse‘ and ‗Dutch Disease‘ as slightly different manifestations 
of the same problem, the two terms can be used interchangeably in most cases. 
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 This phenomenon will be discussed in considerably greater detail later in the work. 
Two locally maintained websites address this problem specifically (―Chesapeake,‖ ―Road 
Damage‖).  
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 The Dutch Disease has been studied at considerable lengths in recent years. The 
term Dutch Disease refers to a phenomenon first observed in Holland that resulted from 
the discovery of natural gas in the 1960s (Tsalik and Ebel 5-6). The Dutch Disease occurs 
as a direct result of the development of extractive industries, which tends create inflows 
of hard currency into the economy in question as the natural resources flow outward. This 
hard currency influx tends to stimulate various problems related to foreign exchange 
rates, particularly as this hard currency is converted into the local currency, essentially 
raising the value of that domestic currency. This inflationary effect tends to increase the 
real cost of producing tradable goods, resulting in less competitive pricing vis-à-vis 
cheaper foreign goods. This affects both the domestic and foreign markets. As sales 
decline in the home economy, labor-intensive, mature industries and economic sectors 
tend to decline, leading to unemployment and increased dependence upon natural 
resource development. This can have highly destructive effects upon both the domestic 
economy as well as upon the public sector, particularly governments highly dependent 
upon tax revenue for service provision.  
While this explanation of the phenomenon seems to focus mostly upon nation-
states, the mechanism remains the same for smaller administrative units within nations, 
such as American states. For areas that have been extremely hard-hit in the past by 
deindustrialization, this economic phenomenon must be taken very seriously. As Tsalik 
and Ebel point out, a great many studies have determined that relatively resource-poor 
countries tend to have stronger growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita than 
countries blessed with natural resource abundance. They go on to note that this disparity 
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in GDP growth per capita actually tends to increase as the price of the commodity in 
question increases.
23
 
Perhaps most important in Tsalik and Ebel‘s work is their recognition that 
suffering from the Dutch Disease does not necessarily represent a foregone conclusion 
for resource-extractive economies.  ―Countries like Botswana, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
have managed to improve development while diversifying their economies from 
excessive reliance on natural resources (Tsalik and Ebel 7).  NRFs seem to be a viable 
policy option for the negative effects of resource extraction-based economies. 
 Until now, research on the Dutch Disease has been limited to considering its 
effects upon entire nations, particularly developing nations.
24
 While some have also 
considered developed nations, particularly Norway, none consider the potential effects of 
the Dutch Disease on political or administrative subdivisions within a nation-state, whose 
economies rely heavily on resource extraction. Part of the aim of this work will be to 
address that issue directly.  
  One of the main reasons Dutch Disease research has been limited to considering 
only nation-states is due in part to the fact that the Dutch Disease is thought to be 
primarily an affliction stemming largely from hard currency-related inflation. The US 
economy in particular is also thought to be large enough to stave off the effects of the 
Dutch Disease by absorbing the potential for currency devaluation and smoothing the 
negative effects for individual states. While both statements are true, there are some 
                                                        
23
 Tsalik and Ebel specifically discuss oil in this particular situation, noting that between 
1960 and 1990, countries with comparatively little oil wealth tended to grow at rates 
ranging from double to triple rates experienced by comparatively oil-rich nations (Tsalik 
and Ebel 3). 
24
 Norway, Russia, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Botswana, and Brazil, among others, are primary 
subjects of study (Wright and Czelusta). 
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problems with this perspective. First, currency devaluation is only one characteristic of 
the Dutch Disease. Indeed, once could argue that the sectoral and localized inflation 
generally experienced in conjunction with the Dutch Disease always exists in some 
capacity in resource-extraction-dependent economies. Certain political or financial 
realities specific to each individual economy serves to exacerbate or mitigate the effects. 
In this way, the states in the US that base a large portion of their economies of resource 
extraction benefit from being part of a large, diversified economy. However, while the 
economy of the nation may be diversified, the local and regional economies tend to be 
less so. The so-called ―Rust Belt‖ cities are a case in point. Despite the fact that many of 
these areas were areas of high industrialization, the fact of the matter remains that these 
areas tended to be, nonetheless, rather one-dimensional and almost as vulnerable to these 
Dutch Disease effects as regions that rely solely on extractive development. The degree 
to which a given economy is dependent upon an industry – extractive or otherwise – 
determines to a great degree how strong a case of the Dutch Disease that economy could 
―catch.‖ 
 The existence of a legitimate, democratic political system likewise lessens the 
difficulties related to corruption most nations, particularly developing nations, tend to 
experience. Overall, countries with good institutions are more likely to benefit from the 
economic blessing and less likely to suffer from the political curse (Cotet and Tsui). 
While Cotet and Tsui are correct on this point, they challenge the existence and power of 
the Dutch Disease by treating entire countries as uniform entities without regional 
differences that could their positions. While the resource curse assumes the existence of a 
resource is an economic blessing (Cotet and Tsui 491), this presumption should be 
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conditionalized. While the resource represents substantial wealth, the questions of how 
those resources, the rents, and royalties are allocated, as well as how quickly those 
resources are developed and extracted must also be addressed. In this way, in addition to 
being an economic boon, natural resources can likewise be an economic curse.  
2.1.6.5 Micro-Inflation/ Sectoral Inflation 
 Just as resource extraction industries can have substantially negative effects on 
macro-level economic issues in a given economy, such industries can also negatively 
affect micro-level concerns. Of particular concern are micro-inflation and sectoral 
inflation, two sides to a common problem.  
 Just as inflation is a result of increased economic activity (oftentimes seen in 
economies in which there have been substantial injections of currency, or when the 
velocity of money increases, or both), micro-inflation is the phenomenon of increased 
economic activity on the very local level. While rarely a concern for most economists, 
micro-inflation can create public policy complications with profound long-term 
outcomes. 
Housing rents, for example, tend to be one of the most sensitive indicators of 
micro-inflation resulting from faster economic development. When more work has been 
created – when a given natural resource begins to be developed – new workers are often 
needed in order to provide the requisite labor force necessary to successfully develop the 
play. This need for additional manpower often necessitates the importation of outside 
labor, particularly for the types of highly specialized jobs required for such industries as 
natural gas development. These new workers require shelter, and oftentimes the 
employers of these workers are willing to pay a premium for such housing. This 
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additional demand created by the new non-indigenous labor, as well as the premium that 
may well be paid for housing, has the effect of driving prices up, putting the squeeze on 
local citizens. If the overall wages and income remain stagnant or growth trails behind 
the increases in costs for housing, the end result can be tremendous pressure upon the 
indigenous population.
25
  
This mechanism functions with particular power on necessities, such as food, 
water, shelter, clothing, etc., that have traditionally high price inelasticity. The net public 
policy result if these issues are not addressed will likely be angry or beleaguered citizens.  
The flip-side to micro-inflation is sectoral inflation. Sectoral inflation is an 
economic phenomenon that occurs when development in a particular sector of the 
economy forces the prices of goods upward. Sectoral inflation essentially manifests as a 
location non-specific supply-side version of micro-inflation. The mechanism looks very 
similar, but the results can be even more detrimental to an economy, as the effects tend to 
be more persistent and more difficult to rectify after the fact. 
Specialized labor shortages represent a good general example of sectoral inflation. 
When specialized labor becomes necessary for a new and fast-growing industry to 
succeed, the new demand places upward pressure on the local (or even regional) labor 
costs, putting pressure upon more mature industries with considerably more stable and 
relatively fixed profit margins. By forcing the cost of labor inputs upward, it becomes 
more difficult for those mature industries and firms to retain the necessary specialized 
labor without trying to compete for those laborers. The net result can easily be the 
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 Because of the nature of such short time horizon boom/bust cycles, public policy 
responses tend to be muted or nonexistent. This lack of response can create or exacerbate 
additional pressures and social impacts upon localities and their citizens, particularly on 
low-income or homeless people.  
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contraction of these more mature industries, leading to a general de-industrialization or 
de-commercialization of the affected area.
26
  
While labor certainly represents the most visible example of sectoral inflation, it 
certainly does not hold a monopoly on being affected by it. Practically any input for 
supply at any point within the supply chain can fall victim to sectoral inflation. The more 
similar the skills or inputs of the resource extractive industry to other industries, the more 
severe the effects on the more mature industry will be.  
 Indeed, there already exists ample reason for concern about the above inflation-
based issues. ―Expenditures at all stages of production generate indirect economic 
impacts as the initial stimulus from expenditures on natural gas development is spent and 
re-spent in other business sectors of the economy‖ (Considine et al. The Economic 
Impacts 18). Considine admits that there will be substantial impacts on the economy, 
locally, regionally, and nationally. However, he fails to acknowledge the potential harm 
these impacts will have upon the economy, either at the macro- or the micro- levels: 
 [T]he construction of supporting infrastructure is a very significant 
undertaking that requires thousands of suppliers of steel, machines, and 
equipment. These suppliers would have to ramp-up to meet this new 
demand by hiring thousands of workers, often in relatively high paying 
manufacturing and construction jobs. Pennsylvania experienced such an 
industrial boom during the last half of the 19
th
 century, leaving behind vast 
wealth that underpins great institutions, such as Carnegie Mellon 
University, which generate benefits for citizens today (Considine et al. 
―An Emerging Giant‖ 6). 
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 Richter‘s article in Foreign Affairs discusses the Fed‘s role in tamping down inflation 
concerns as well as the effect immigration tends to have in assisting in such policy 
concerns. It should be noted that labor inflation has been a chief concern informing 
Federal Reserve policy dating back to Volcker‘s term, and particularly under the 
chairmanship of Alan Greenspan (Richter). 
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While the actual net effects of this development remain unclear at present, the overall net 
result will likely fall well short of the panacea that many boosters of shale gas 
development. 
Similarly, as the demand for steel pipe increases with the continuing development 
of the MSF, the price for steel pipe (and steel as well) will rise, affecting other sectors of 
the economy. This type of inflation can have dramatic and negative effects upon other 
industries within an economy, depressing overall economic activity despite the increase 
in economic activity in the sector that initially created the sectoral inflation. Not only 
could sectoral inflation exacerbate a recession if it occurs during one, it could potentially 
be the root cause of a recession, particularly on a local or regional level. Considine makes 
a point to establish the level of economic growth that would result in the development of 
the MSF.  
The Marcellus industry purchases of goods and services, their royalties to 
landowners, and tax payments directly create more than 14,000 jobs in 
Pennsylvania. Indirect and induced impacts create even more jobs so that 
total jobs created by the Marcellus industry is estimated at 29,284…. The 
results of this study indicate that for every $1 million of output created by 
natural gas in the Pennsylvania Marcellus, 6.9 jobs are created (Considine 
et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 25). 
 
Such a dramatic expansion in one particular sector of the economy could easily produce 
negative side effects for numerous other industries. 
2.1.7 Mitigating Negative Externalities 
 Policymakers tend to fall into two categories in response to negative externalities. 
On the one hand are the laissez-faire policymakers who tend to put considerable faith in 
the power of the market to mitigate or rectify market failures or pressures that will affect 
citizens. On the other hand, some policymakers take a more active approach, concerning 
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themselves with the immediate welfare of citizens. For those policymakers who tend to 
take a more active role, there exist a number of policy responses. Two of the most 
popular, and most effective, are severance taxes and NRFs. 
2.1.7.1 Severance Tax 
Severance taxes
27
 provide the opportunity to mitigate issues that may arise as a 
result of natural resource extraction. Thirty-five states in the US have already instituted 
some form of resource extraction severance tax,
28
 as well as many nations.
29
 These taxes 
can be as general or specific as the imposing government chooses, both from the 
standpoint of how specifically the tax can be assessed and how the proceeds of the tax is 
spent. For the most part, states that have severance taxes on extractive industries choose 
to funnel most of those royalties into their general fund. West Virginia and Alaska are 
notable exceptions.
30
 Much of that state‘s severance tax revenue gets spent on 
environmental remediation efforts for coal-related environmental destruction. The 
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 Severance taxes are defined as ―a tax levied by a state on the extractor of oil, gas, or 
minerals intended for consumption in other states‖ (―Severance tax‖).  
28
 A list of U.S. states that have adopted severance taxes is included later in this work. 
29
 Nations that have instituted natural resource funds tend to use some form of severance 
tax to provide revenue for their NRFs.  
30
 Fifteen U.S. states remit a portion of severance royalties back to localities. Those states 
include the following: Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Ten states set aside, as a matter of law, a percentage of the 
severance taxes collected for environmental remediation and for additional conservation 
efforts. These states include the following: California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, 
Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Most states 
choose to fund these allocations as expenditures in the general fund, making them subject 
to the normal political process, whereas a small handful (Alaska, New Mexico, and 
Wyoming) use a separate fund, much like numerous nation-states have chosen to do. This 
policy option serves essentially to insulate the funding of those policies from many, if not 
all, political conflicts. Alaska also uses the proceeds of its severance taxes to both fund its 
NRF as well as provide what amounts to a pension to every citizen of the state. West 
Virginia employs a large portion of their collected severance proceeds for a number of 
uses, including environmental remediation (―Shared Costs‖).  
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following three tables illustrate how complicated the process of comparison can be when 
considering the severance tax regimes of various states. States use a variety of different 
calculation methods. This obviously does not lend itself easily to comparison. Table 2 
provides a list of all states with current severance taxes, the amount of revenue those 
severance taxes provide to their respective states, and the percentage of the total state 
revenue the respective severance taxes make up. Table 3 shows the specific severance tax 
structures for the top 15 state natural gas producers in the US. Table 4 lists states with 
any sort of natural resource severance taxes and the resources upon which those taxes are 
levied.  
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Table 2. State Severance Tax Collections by State (thousands of dollars)
31
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 Total taxes include: property tax, general sales and gross receipts, motor fuel sales 
taxes, alcoholic beverages, public utilities, insurance, tobacco products, pari-mutuels, 
amusements, other selective sales and gross receipts, alcoholic beverages, public utilities, 
motor vehicles, motor vehicle operator, corporations in general, hunting and fishing 
licenses, occupation and business licenses, other licenses taxes, individual income taxes, 
corporation net income taxes, death and gift taxes, severance taxes, documentary and 
stock transfer taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes. 
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Table 3. Severance Tax Rates and Corporate Taxes in the Top 15 Natural Gas Producing States 
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Table 4. States with Severance Taxes 
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Table 4 (continued). States with Severance Taxes
32
 
 
2.1.7.1.1 Use of Severance Tax Revenue 
 
When the proceeds of a severance tax are placed directly into the general fund, it 
can create substantial incentives on the part of policymakers to spend the new money. 
Aside from the obvious profligacy of such behavior, other problems can arise. In brief, 
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 The leap in crude oil prices recently has had a noticeable effect on state severance tax 
collections reported to the Census Bureau. In 16 states, severance taxes accounted for at 
least 1 percent of state tax collections in 2007, with Alaska leading the pack (Zelio and 
Houlihan).  
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such spending can exacerbate general, localized, and sectoral inflation, it can exhaust the 
compensation for the sale of a given state‘s patrimony, and the money can create a more 
onerous social spending burden which, when the source of new revenue potentially dries 
up in the future, can inadvertently cause contraction or cessation of services upon which 
citizens have come to rely. 
2.1.7.1.2 Severance Taxes as Economic “Brakes” 
The imposition of some form of severance tax upon the Marcellus development 
may or may not dramatically impair economic development in Pennsylvania. If the 
Considine reports are to be believed, there may be a reduction in how quickly the 
Marcellus will be developed. While this debate is still ongoing, the imposition of a 
severance tax will not prevent development of the MSF in Pennsylvania, as has been seen 
in all other states with oil and gas development. Pennsylvania is the only state with 
appreciable oil or gas production that has not imposed some form of severance on 
extraction. The fact that development has proceeded everywhere else in the US with the 
presence of a severance tax undermines the argument against a severance tax.  
While the severance tax may reduce the rate of development (particularly if 
Considine‘s report is correct), this may be a more prudent long-term strategy. As that 
report states: 
[T]his [severance] tax cannot be passed on to consumers and, therefore, 
drilling activity would decline by more than 30 percent and result in an 
estimated $880 million net loss in the present value of tax revenue 
between now and 2020. Severance tax revenue gains are more than offset 
by declining state and local income taxes resulting from lower drilling 
activity under the severance tax. The high level of drilling activity in 
Pennsylvania is a function of relatively lower taxes. This competitive 
advantage should be maintained as the Marcellus competes for capital and 
labor with other shale plays around the nation. Imposing a severance tax at 
this early stage of development could significantly inhibit the growth of 
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the Marcellus gas industry in Pennsylvania (Considine et al. ―An 
Emerging Giant‖ ii).33 
 
One of the main problems with the resource curse is the rate of development vis-à-vis the 
rest of the economy. This is highly dependent upon the overall price of gas, specifically 
the Henry Hub
34
 price and including any royalty and extraction taxes. This is important to 
note, since a severance tax amounts to what is essentially an additional production cost 
directly to the natural gas industry.
35
 This is because these costs cannot be passed on to 
the end user, thanks to the competitive nature of the gas market at large. If the imposition 
of the severance tax could potentially temper the exuberance with which gas extraction 
companies rush into the MSF, conceivably much of the pain associated with natural 
resource extraction could be minimized to some degree. This reduction in development 
would be a short-term development. Since the price of natural gas is likely to both 
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 To elaborate, Considine‘s argument against imposing a severance tax is based on the 
assumption that Marcellus development in Pennsylvania should occur as quickly as 
possible in order to maximize the potential economic benefits. However, as the literature 
that addresses the Dutch Disease emphasizes, the speed at which resource extraction 
occurs can have dramatic effects upon the sectoral and locality-based externalities. 
Therefore, if the aim of Pennsylvania lawmakers is to create a sustainable model of 
development that both allows for resource extraction and aims to mitigate the works 
excesses of Dutch Disease/resource curse externalities, it stands to reason that slowing 
down natural gas development may, in fact, be a viable public policy approach. This, of 
course, assumes that Considine‘s argument about the potential effects of the imposition 
of a severance tax are correct.  
34
 Henry Hub is the convergence point for a number of major American natural gas 
pipelines. When speaking of Henry Hub pricing, this term refers to Henry Hub as the 
pricing point basis and official delivery point for American natural gas futures contracts 
trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).  
35
 It is important to note that severance taxes represent but one variable that companies 
consider when determining where to develop hydrocarbons (or other extractive 
resources). While the argument could be successfully made that, all other variables being 
equal, severance tax rates will determine the competitiveness or financial viability of 
developing a given resource, rarely – if ever – will that be the case. Once again, this has 
been observed in all other states that have oil or gas development. All except 
Pennsylvania have imposed severance taxes on the oil and gas industry operating in their 
boundaries. 
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become more volatile and generally rise as the demand for the fuel rises and the 
penetration into the market for more diversified uses increases, it makes sense to curtail 
the ramping up of production so that the rents
36
 of the resource can be maximized. This 
would place Pennsylvania in good company with other resource-extractive economies the 
world over, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Venezuela,
37
 among others. Such rent-
maximizing behavior (as opposed to profit-maximizing behavior) in the natural gas 
market will likely have a similar price-stabilizing effect on the natural gas market as it 
does on the oil market. While volatility cannot be eliminated altogether, minimizing it 
makes formulating policy considerably easier in the long run. 
2.1.7.2 Natural Resource Funds (NRFs) 
In the United States, twenty-six states have substantial amounts of resource 
extraction-based development.
38
 Many nations also find themselves in a similar set of 
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 The term rent refers to the financial return received by the owner of a given property in 
excess of the cost of production/maintenance. In this case, rents refer to the return 
received from the development of some natural resource (e.g., natural gas, oil) that 
exceeds the costs of production for said resource. More commonly, the term is typically 
employed in relation to real estate, whereby tenants will pay a set rate for using the 
property, and represents return over and above the capital appreciation and the cost of 
maintenance for that property.  
37
 Dag Harald Claes, in his now-famous work ―The Politics of Oil-Producer Cooperation‖ 
delves deeply into this subject, making the argument that, with few exceptions – namely 
Kuwait – oil-producing nations have an economic incentive to maximize rents rather than 
profits. This is due in large part to the fundamental difference between profit-maximizing 
corporations, whose main (only?) bottom-line concern is profit-maximization, and the 
manifold concerns facing oil-producing nations. 
38
 There is no standard percentage to which to refer when speaking of substantial levels 
of economic activity based upon resource extraction. There are many variables to 
consider. For some nations, like Venezuela, rely heavily on extractive industries. 
Approximately one-third of Venezuela‘s total GDP, four-fifths of its exports, and more 
than half of all government revenues are due to petroleum extraction and associated 
industries. On the other hand, approximately one-fifth of Norway‘s GDP and almost half 
of total exports is due to oil or natural gas (―CIA World Factbook – Norway,‖ ―CIA 
World Factbook – Venezuela,‖ ―Norway,‖ ―Venezuela‖).  
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circumstances, with large portions of their overall economy based upon natural resource 
extraction. The percentage of a given nation‘s overall economy that is dependant upon 
resource extraction can vary greatly, but all of them will be subjected to the 
complications of this type of development to some greater or lesser extent. 
 Many of the problems these states have experienced are microcosms of the issues 
facing entire nations that base large portions of their economic activity upon resource 
extraction. The states, just as the nations, suffer many ills. Dutch Disease and price 
volatility rank high on the list of concerns, just as infrastructure costs, environmental 
degradation, and sectoral and micro-inflation do. These states would do well to consider 
public policies that many of these nations have chosen to pursue. According to Tsalik and 
Ebel, NRFs can be an effective policy mechanism for stabilizing government spending 
and revenues, particularly in light of the volatile nature of commodity markets. 
Moreover, NSFs can help mitigate complications arising from the Dutch Disease by 
―sterilizing‖ royalty revenues by preventing the injection of substantial amounts of export 
revenues from entering the domestic economy, thereby preventing the problems arising 
from hard-currency-driven inflationary pressures from overheating the economy (Tsalik 
and Ebel 6). 
Moreover, NRFs can also be employed in multiple ways to serve a multitude of 
public policy goals. Typically, NRFs are employed as either stabilization funds or as 
future savings funds. Some governments choose to employ NSFs for both purposes. 
Stabilization funds can be employed to ―smooth out‖ government expenditures by 
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redirecting tax or royalty revenues to the NSF when commodity prices rise, providing a 
source of additional revenue for the government in question when resource prices – and 
their concomitant revenues – fall (Tsalik and Ebel 18). By providing a mechanism to 
divert and invest revenues when commodity prices rise, a given government then has a 
fund set aside to reliably fund future policy initiatives, even in a sustained period of low 
prices or high price volatility.  
 Another major concern of governments dependent upon resource extraction is the 
prospect of exploiting its citizens‘ patrimony, either through outright profligacy, or 
through the natural depletion of a given limited, non-renewable resource. Natural 
resources, typically by their very nature, are scarce and non-renewable. By 
acknowledging this fact as well as embracing the idea that these depletable resources also 
belong to future generations, the establishment of a NSF for use as a savings fund or 
―future generations‖ fund can allow for the storing of wealth to be used by future citizens. 
By creating a storehouse of wealth and then using that wealth to generate a stream of 
income, the NSF operates in much the same way as pensions operate for individuals 
(Tsalik and Ebel 18). In addition, by setting aside a portion of the proceeds from the 
royalty payments, a given government can protect against the short-term exhaustion of 
the resource royalty windfall resulting from extraction.  
 Many nations around the world,
39
 as well as the state of Alaska, have instituted 
NRFs to better mitigate and manage the attendant effects of resource extraction. Many 
have been successful, and some certainly more than others.  
2.1.7.2.1 Importance of bringing stakeholders to the table 
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 Some examples include Norway, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia (Tsalik and 
Ebel). 
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NRFs also provide the potential for bringing stakeholders to the decision-making 
table, rather than allowing the decisions for spending those funds to be made without 
direct public scrutiny. This allows for consideration of the potential impacts to 
stakeholders and their non-financial concerns, such as: environmental, water usage, local 
infrastructure degradation, socio-demographic changes, local economic, health and 
safety, consumer protection, legal and regulatory effects, local governmental 
responsibility, local service demands, etc.
40
 
2.1.8 Boom and Bust Cycles 
The modern hydrocarbon era began in Pennsylvania on August 28, 1859, when 
―Colonel‖ Edwin Laurentine Drake struck oil outside of Titusville, Pennsylvania (Green). 
From those inauspicious beginnings, American and world oil and gas development began 
in earnest. Today, Pennsylvania stands at the cusp of yet another hydrocarbon revolution, 
one that will move the market from a climate dominated by oil to one dictated by the 
supply of natural gas. The original strike in Pennsylvania led to an abrupt boom, and an 
even more abrupt bust, leaving many Pennsylvanians in worse shape than before the oil 
strike. With Marcellus shale production, the development is promising wealth, jobs, 
cheaper energy, greater national energy independence, and a new future for the state.  
Yet the history of Titusville still lingers. Many Pennsylvanians seem stricken with 
fear of what this new hydrocarbon development might bring – and not without good 
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 Just because NSFs provide potential for bringing stakeholders to the table, this should 
not be mistaken as a guarantee for such interaction. Indeed, much research indicates that 
political corruption, perhaps more than any other variable, determines the degree to 
which stakeholders can be brought to the policy negotiation table.  
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reason. The fruits of this development very well could be as arbitrarily enjoyed as those 
from Drake‘s play. 
Oil in particular has seen its volatility skyrocket as a direct result of its dual nature 
as a commodity and a financial instrument (Moors). As natural gas phases in as another 
―dual use‖ resource, it will likely become subject to similar market forces. A quick look 
at the general trend over the period from 1989 to 2005 for both natural gas and oil prices 
illustrates how the prices of oil and natural gas are related. The following graphical 
depiction shows overlays of historical Henry Hub prices with West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) crude prices.
41
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 West Texas Intermediate refers to the type and quality of oil historically extracted from 
Texas, particularly in the Permian Basin of West Texas. WTI oil has traditionally been of 
high quality, exhibiting both relatively low density and low sulfur content. Hence, the use 
of the phrase ―light, sweet‖ when referring to oil quality. High-density oil, like what is 
typically found in the Orinoco Basin in Venezuela, and sour crude, like what is typically 
found in Saudi Arabia, tends to sell at a discount to the benchmark pricing. WTI has been 
used as the benchmark for North American crude oil pricing on the NYMEX, whereas 
Brent pricing (from the North Sea) is used as the benchmark for European, African, and 
Middle Eastern crude oil pricing (―Brent Crude,‖ ―North Sea,‖ ―West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI),‖ ―West Texas Intermediate – Wikipedia‖).  
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Figure 1. Henry Hub and West Texas Intermediate Prices (1989-2005) 
 
The 1859 Pennsylvania oil strike at Titusville provides us a further a case in point 
(―ExplorePAHistory.com‖). While many in Pennsylvania may see the original American 
oil strike and subsequent development as a case for considerably stronger environmental 
protection, it likewise provides an example of unregulated and unmitigated economic 
development which, when not managed properly, leaves an economic wasteland in its 
wake. As covered previously, it is clear from the historical record that extractive industry 
has a tendency to unleash many uncontrolled and unanticipated forces upon given 
localities. Not only did the Titusville strike create vast fortunes and cause horrible 
environmental damage, it also wiped out entire towns and populations when the oil dried 
up. Such boom-bust industrial development plays havoc with proper policy management, 
  38 
and very well could lead to choking off all other surrounding economic activity, even if 
that economic activity seemingly has no connection to the extractive industry in question. 
In addition, Alaska‘s recent write-down of oil reserve figures provides a more 
recent example of the drawbacks of price volatility (Heimel). When a number of oil 
companies operating in Alaska wrote down their oil reserve estimates, the state found 
itself in the unenviable position of having a large portion of its expected future revenues 
from oil extraction evaporate overnight. As a result, Alaska now faces substantial 
budgetary and economic crises that will worsen going forward.  In this case overly 
optimistic estimates were given; but reality has led to a future fund shortfall (Levisohn).  
2.1.9 Gas Pricing and Volatility 
Aside from the most recent and precipitous drop in world natural gas prices – 
which was fundamentally unrelated to the energy markets
42
 – there has been a sharp and 
substantial increase in the overall price of natural gas since 2001. Three major causes for 
this boom include demand growth, gas-oil linkage, and speculation.
43
 
There are many factors that help determine natural gas prices. The following is a 
list of many of the some of the largest considerations for determining gas prices 
(Gilardoni 116-20):  
 
Price seasonality 
Cost of production, transportation, storage, and distribution 
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 The primary reason for the drop in natural gas prices since 2008 owes more to the 
overall world economy – and the subprime mortgage bubble‘s effect on it – than new 
natural gas production. Only now is the economy recovering to levels approaching pre-
recession levels.  
43
 ―These contracts, historically fundamental to investments in infrastructure, are still 
very important even though in the last ten years the spot and forward markets have grown 
in importance. The structure of these contracts allows a change in prices, with a certain 
delay, changes that are very often indexed to oil prices‖ (Gilardoni 6). 
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Region/country specificity 
Political relationships between parties and nations 
Size/type of customer 
Contractual structure of supply agreement 
Oil linkage 
Risk markets and speculation 
Regulations 
Taxation 
Balance of supply and demand 
National events 
Market expectations 
 
As one can imagine, many of these factors can be either endogenous or 
exogenous, depending upon a number of issues. There again, such lack of uniformity in 
the gas market – which the expansion of the LNG market and more sustained and 
converging gas prices should remedy – makes price volatility a rather major concern, 
particularly for policymakers who depend upon revenues and royalties from natural gas 
extraction and production. 
One of the primary ways in which gas prices are determined is by the market for 
natural gas that is established by ―take-or-pay‖ contracts.44  
Speculation has a dramatic effect upon natural gas prices for many reasons. For 
the purpose of this work, the important point to remember is that, while speculation is 
critical to maintaining market liquidity, the speculation itself has a tendency to drive 
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 Take-or-pay contracts are structured in such a way that the contract purchaser must 
either accept the goods under contract, or suffer some pre-contracted penalty. 
The importance of these contracts was, of course, seen in the recent diplomatic blow-up, 
no pun intended) between Russia and Turkmenistan, when Gazprom essentially refused 
to honor the agreed-upon take-or-pay agreements. Mysteriously the pipeline pressure 
between the two nations fluctuated slightly, leading to a rather dramatic and coincidental 
gas explosion on the border between the two former Soviet republics. 
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prices upward. According to some sources, the real effect of speculation may be a net 
increase in the price of natural gas of over 30%.
45
 
More important than the amount of speculation is the type of speculation – 
enormous bets by non-traditional, e.g., hedge funds and other non-end-users, causes more 
market volatility rather than less volatility, as one might expect with an increase in the 
volume of speculation.  
According to Gilardoni, there are at least two different theories about the 
evolution of natural gas prices. The first theory is based on the historical trends of oil 
prices, and their tendency to follow a pattern of extended waves, i.e., long-term price 
increases followed by long-term price decreases. The second theory is based on the 
assumption that changes in hydrocarbon prices are structural in nature, due in large part 
to changes in the political relationships between the producing and consuming countries. 
The demand for energy will steadily grow, resulting in a constant pressure on supply, 
pushing prices ever higher (Gilardoni 8).  
Both of these theories carry a fair amount of weight, insofar as they both are 
empirically based and describe, to some degree, how the oil and gas markets have 
behaved in the past. However, rather than being at odds with one another, these 
mechanisms in actuality function in conjunction with one another, for a variety of 
reasons. As Moors‘ research into oil volatility and the last three years demonstrates, these 
long waves will be punctuated by extreme fluctuations in oil prices – due to oil‘s dual 
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 ―A US Senate investigation demonstrated the negative impact of uncontrolled 
speculation by increasing real prices, with damaging consequences for businesses and 
families. According to some analysts, although it is very difficult to calculate, the extent 
of speculation has grown dramatically in the last five years, reaching levels in excess of 
US $100 billion for the US market alone‖ (Gilardoni 6).  
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nature as both a commodity and a financial instrument – and the two trends mentioned 
above will serve as mutually reinforcing attributes of the overall energy markets. As this 
hyper-volatility compels much of the industrialized world to move into a post-petroleum 
scenario, in which the fuel source of choice for electricity production and transportation 
will no longer be coal and oil, respectively, one can expect the same rules of volatility to 
eventually apply to natural gas as they seem to apply to oil in the current climate. This 
volatility, particularly from a budgetary and macroeconomic perspective, must be 
addressed directly, otherwise succumbing to the resource curse becomes an ever greater 
potential developmental threat.  
There can really no longer be talk of domestic energy markets without addressing 
their place within the larger context of the world energy market. The respective domestic 
markets are becoming ever-more intrinsically linked, and are affected by the goings-on 
within other nations and, more importantly, regional markets. Regional markets have 
increased in importance due in great part to the lack of a unified world market and lack of 
a distribution network like what oil has developed over the past century. This, however, 
is changing almost daily. With the adoption of LNG use and production worldwide – 
Qatar led the way by turning all of its natural gas production to LNG right before the 
recent international economic collapse – soon natural gas will be every bit as fungible, 
and considerably more abundant than oil.  
Therefore, there is currently no single baseline price for natural gas, and no single 
global gas market. Historically, the gas market has been regional and pricing largely 
local.  
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As Gilardoni notes, the United States in particular led the way developing natural 
gas production and usage due mostly to the presence of the largest and most 
technologically and financially advanced oil and gas companies on the planet, 
specifically ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron (22). Despite the fact that 
American conventional gas production peaked somewhere during 2001, American 
unconventional gas production has yet to really even begin. This is in addition to the fact 
that, despite reaching peak production, the US still maintains substantial conventional 
reserves. Thus, just as the US led the way in developing its conventional reserves, so it 
likewise leads the world in unconventional development, and also can claim substantial – 
albeit not the largest in the world– unconventional reserves in the form of shale gas, tight 
gas, coal-bed methane, and methane hydrates. In fact, it is entirely conceivable that total 
US natural gas production (conventional and unconventional) will increase well beyond 
the levels reached by conventional production only (Gilardoni 22).  
The current US ―energy mix,‖ or rather the proportion of energy the US employs 
from various sources, has not changed dramatically over the previous thirty years 
(Gilardoni 42). However, this will undoubtedly change soon, as new rules recently passed 
by Congress will go into effect starting at the beginning of 2012. These new rules will 
essentially force the mothballing of a number of coal-fired plants, since retrofitting the 
requisite scrubbing technology remains terribly cost-prohibitive, particularly for the older 
plants. Some have predicted that natural gas usage will increase substantially in order to 
make up the difference in power generation.   
Particularly until the gas market can truly be called an international market, one of 
the most important single factors determining the price of natural gas is its linkage to oil 
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prices (Gilardoni 127). This so-called ―gas-oil linkage‖ is due in large part to the pricing 
of take-or-pay contracts for natural gas, which are essentially long-term contracts, 
generally between large producers and consumers. These take-or-pay contracts have 
historically been based upon oil prices, and generally are agreed upon for periods often in 
excess of decades.  
While the individual spot markets are beginning to develop into a more 
comprehensive system, thanks in large part to more and better sources of LNG, much of 
the price of natural gas remains determined by this contract price linkage to oil. In the 
intermediate term, while the global natural gas market establishes itself but is still heavily 
impacted by oil prices, it will be interesting to see precisely how much the predicted 
volatility of oil will affect natural gas prices (Gilardoni 131-2). 
2.1.10 Short Term vs. Long Term Production Potential  
Another concern related to the development of natural resources, but specific to 
shale gas extraction – as well as deepwater oil and gas, and other types of unconventional 
gas development – is the comparatively high front-end production of the resource in 
question, and the way in which it stands in stark contrast to production in later years. As 
much as 60% of the total extractable natural gas volume from a given well will be 
extracted within a period of between 18 and 36 months from the initial well spudding 
(Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 6). One need only compare the depletion curves 
of the examples cited above with those of more ―normal‖ hydrocarbons, such as 
conventional natural gas or onshore oil, to get a sense of the problem. Due to the highly 
front-end-loaded extraction, many of the potential benefits of shale gas extraction could 
easily be mitigated by the negative effects that such development would entail. Therefore, 
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policymakers should strongly consider this aspect of shale gas development before 
making long-term plans on any number of policies.   
2.2 A Changing Landscape: How Pennsylvania’s Resources are Impacted 
The MSF will undoubtedly have a profound effect, both positive and negative, on 
Pennsylvania. This has been witnessed in other shale gas developments in the U.S., 
particularly in the Barnett and Haynesville formations. It stands to reason that, to some 
greater or lesser degree, the development experiences in those places will likely provide 
indications as to what will happen moving forward in the Marcellus. 
2.2.1 Previous US Shale Gas Development 
As noted previously, the MSF development follows the Barnett and Haynesville 
formations as major shale gas developments in the United States. Of these two, the 
Barnett shale formation (BSF) is the larger and older play.
46
 The BSF covers 
approximately 5,000 square miles of the north-central part of Texas.  Figure 2 shows the 
location of the primary production area of the BSF in Texas.  
  
                                                        
46
 ―Natural gas production from shale deposits began during the 1980s with the 
development of the Barnett Shale play in the Fort Worth, Texas region. During 2008 this 
field alone produced 3.8 BCF per day. Just five years prior in 2003, it produced 0.8 BCF 
per day‖ (Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 5). 
  45 
Figure 2. Barnett Shale Formation Location Map 
 
 
Source: The Perryman Group (“Barnett Shale Impact Study”) 
 
Barnett development began in 1981 with the spudding of vertical wells, and 
proceeded eventually to the developmental convergence of horizontal drilling and 
hydrofracturing into a single process. The Barnett, it has been said, has become the true 
―proving ground‖ for economically viable shale gas development (―Shale Gas 
Reservoirs‖).  
Based on a recent economic impact report on the BSF development published in 
2009, ―[t]here are more than 10,500 wells and 222 companies operating in the Barnett 
Shale…. In 2008, the Barnett Shale generated 111,131 permanent jobs and pumped more 
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than $11 billion into the regional economy, a net gain of more than 30 percent over the 
previous year‖ (Bennett ―Barnett Shale‖).  
The well and job data on the BSF provides a conservative starting point for 
estimating expected output in the MSF. Considine, Engelder, and Lash, along with most 
other analysts dealing with the MSF, have based their estimates of the MSF on the BSF. 
Therefore, the BSF, with relatively smaller size and less-rich deposits compared to the 
MSF, can give a conservative estimate of what to expect moving forward as development 
proceeds in the MSF.  
As beneficial as the Barnett (and the Haynesville) development has arguably been 
for their respective economies, a more balanced and broader view should be taken when 
discussing the more localized conditions and attendant problems there. Whitmer and 
Brasier opined that local conditions – particularly economic, environmental, and 
infrastructural – will have profound impacts on the exploration and development of 
natural gas. Moreover, due to the variations in those conditions between and among 
various localities where shale gas development is taking place, the policy options 
available to each particular locality will differ considerably (Whitmer and Brasier). 
While the development of the MSF will benefit some areas and negatively impact 
others, the benefits certainly will not accrue equally or uniformly. Indeed, some areas, or 
even entire regions, may receive little if any benefit to the development and experience 
many of the negative attendant effects, whereas other areas very well could experience 
rather outsized benefits and yet experience few, if any, of the negative externalities. Such 
asymmetrical or unfair outcomes necessitate statewide public policy action in such 
circumstances. 
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2.2.2 Marcellus Shale Specifics 
Marcellus shale
47
 is a type of stratified rock located approximately a mile beneath 
the surface of the earth, stretching from southern West Virginia through Ohio and 
Pennsylvania into southern New York state. Figure 3 shows the extent of the Marcellus 
formation in Pennsylvania. 
 
Figure 3. Marcellus Shale Formation Location Map 
 
 
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
The shale has a substantial percentage of organic material which, when correctly 
developed, yields copious amounts of natural gas. That gas can then be used for a host of 
ends. The Marcellus formation is the largest shale gas formation of its kind in the world. 
To put this into perspective, it contains an estimated almost 500 trillion cubic feet (TCF) 
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 ―The Marcellus shale is an organic-rich black shale that was deposited in an oxygen-
deficient marine environment during Middle Devonian time (~390 million years ago)‖ 
(Harper). 
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of in situ natural gas reserves. The amount of extractable volume continues to climb, 
from the initial estimates ranging between 75-100 TCF to the more current estimates
48
 
that surpass the initial estimates by more than 100%. The initial estimates of extractable 
volume of natural gas could conceivably supply the entire United States‘ natural gas 
needs for over two years (Engelder), whereas more recent (and admittedly less 
conservative) estimates could provide as many as 20 years‘ worth of domestic natural gas 
demand. The United States currently consumes more natural gas than any other nation in 
the world – almost twice as much as Russia, the next nation on the list. Thus, even if only 
the lower estimates prove accurate, the volume of extractable gas being discussed here 
could have profound effects upon the natural gas market, worldwide. 
The Marcellus, like the Barnett and the Haynesville plays, also requires highly 
specialized geo-engineering techniques in order to develop and extract the gas trapped 
within it, particularly hydrofracking and horizontal drilling. 
2.2.2.1 Justifications for MSF recoverable volume 
 Many experts have proffered numerous estimates of recoverable natural gas 
volume for the MSF. These estimates have varied from the low end of 25 TCF to 
upwards of 400 TCF. While all of these various estimates have some basis for 
justification, the most statistically sound (and credibly conservative) estimate comes from 
Engelder and Lash: 
 Given a resource that is found under more than 34,000,000 acres of real 
estate with at least 50 feet of organic-rich section, the Marcellus Shale 
weighs in with more than 500 trillion cubic feet of gas in-place spread 
over a four state area. Continuous natural gas accumulations such as the 
Barnett Shale produce more than 10 percent of the gas in-place, which 
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 Moors and other sources predict volumes ranging from 150 TCF to as much as 500 
TCF of extractable volumes.  
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when applied to the Marcellus Shale, translates to a resource that will 
return 50 Tcf in time. Confusion arises when this figure for technically 
recoverable gas is compared with the U.S. Geological Survey‘s prediction 
of 1.9 Tcf for an undiscovered resource in a portion of the Marcellus. The 
two numbers should not be compared, since the USGS figure relies 
heavily on knowledge of the ultimate recoverable gas per well. Because 
there has been little production from the Marcellus, the USGS figure is 
inherently low, but will begin to climb when production comes on line. 
Production from the Huron/Dunkirk interval of the Big Sandy Field has 
enabled the USGS to predict an undiscovered resource of 6.3 Tcf. This 
field has less than 25 percent of acreage found within the boundaries of 
the Marcellus play, and the average depth of the Big Sandy Field is less 
than that of the heart of the Marcellus play. The scaling factor between the 
Big Sandy Field and the Marcellus play is about eight, which means that 
all else being equal, extrapolating the Dunkirk/Huron play suggests a total 
resource of the Marcellus play of nearly 50 Tcf. With this extrapolation, 
the USGS and Engelder-Lash estimates are in agreement. (Engelder and 
Lash). 
 
Based on the Engelder/Lash estimates, the Marcellus formation potentially holds enough 
natural gas to turn the state into a net exporter of natural gas, rather than a substantial 
importer. While this may sound a bit underwhelming, it must be kept in mind that this 
amount of an available natural resource amounts to substantial market power in the form 
of commodity price stability and national security. Moreover, from the standpoint of 
statewide economic development, this price stability will make budgetary decisions 
considerably easier to make, since it is the potential volatility in price as much as the 
additional economic activity and other attendant issues that leads to difficult budgetary 
and economic pressures. As a result, policymakers must place themselves in a position to 
determine the most publicly favorable means of development, in order to most positively 
affect the eventual outcomes of this new industrial development. 
2.2.3 Road Maintenance and Water Usage: Study Variables 
2.2.3.1 Road Infrastructure Issues 
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 Practically all industrial development involves the imposition of negative 
externalities to the surrounding environment to some degree. Mineral extraction in 
general, and oil and gas development in particular, causes a range of different types of 
negative externalities. Drilling of any kind requires the use of heavy equipment, which 
must be trucked in by large tractor-trailer trucks. Roadway damage is an expected result 
of drilling as a result.  
On September 30, 2009, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) 
of the state of New York issued the Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact 
Statement (SGEIS), addressing numerous issues and complications arising from potential 
natural gas drilling activities in the Marcellus Shale formation. The following is a listing 
of the estimated truck trips necessary in order to develop a single shale gas well 
(―Marcellus Shale gas‖). The trips have also been broken out by the respective phase of 
activity and the number of trips per phase.  
Drilling Rig Mobilization, Site Preparation and Demobilization 
 Drill Pad and Road Construction Equipment 10 – 45 Truckloads 
 Drilling Rig 30 Truckloads 
 Drilling Fluid and Materials 25 – 50 Truckloads 
 Drilling Equipment (casing, drill pipe, etc.) 25 – 50 Truckloads 
 Completion Rig Mobilization and Demobilization 
 Completion Rig 15 Truckloads 
Well Completion 
 Completion Fluid and Materials 10 - 20 Truckloads 
 Completion Equipment (pipe, wellhead) 5 Truckloads 
 Hydraulic Fracture Equipment (pump trucks, tanks) 150 - 200 Truckloads 
 Hydraulic Fracture Water 400 - 600 Tanker Trucks 
 Hydraulic Fracture Sand 20 - 25 Trucks 
 Flow Back Water Removal 200 - 300 Truckloads 
 Well Production 
 Production Equipment 5 – 10 Truckloads 
As soon as drilling begins at a given location, traffic increases dramatically. As 
mentioned above, this traffic primarily consists of extremely heavy truck traffic. The first 
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truckloads bring in heavy excavation equipment. If the wellsite is located in forested area, 
like much of the development in Pennsylvania, then the equipment also includes forestry 
equipment. The excavation equipment is used to prepare the wellpad site, where the bulk 
of the drilling activity will take place. After creating the egress roads and grading the 
wellpad site itself, hundreds of tons of gravel are trucked in, both for the wellpad itself 
and for the access road. 
Once the wellpad has been fully prepared, many more trucks – all extremely 
heavy, weighing many tons each – haul in the drilling rig, which will enable the 
horizontal drilling process that makes shale gas economically feasible in the first place. 
Of course, once the drilling of the well has been completed, this equipment must be 
hauled away from the drilling site to make space for the equipment and water needed to 
perform the hydraulic fracturing, which actually releases the bulk of shale gas for 
extraction. As is often the case, multiple wells may be drilled and fracked from the same 
wellpad, adding to the amount of traffic with which a given location must deal. The 
fracking process includes various types of equipment, from the actual high-pressure 
pumping equipment to water holding tanks, tanker trucks, support trucks, sand trucks, 
etc. (―Road damage‖). 
Based on the information above, each shale gas well requires at least 905 separate 
truck trips, and potentially as many as 1,320 – the bulk of which is primarily water. The 
number of truckloads needed to frack wells ranges from 476-667 trips (at 3 million 
gallons) to 714-1,000 trips (at 4.5 million gallons). 
Water represents the single most traffic-intensive component of shale gas 
development, but certainly is not the only issue. In fact, while water as a factor of 
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production represents the highest number of truck trips, some of the excavation and 
drilling equipment needed to prepare the wellpad and drill the well can be considerably 
heavier than water loads. However, since water is the single largest factor in fracking a 
shale gas well, it seems to make sense to consider that facet of the process more closely.  
According to Chesapeake Energy‘s website, the water trucks most often used in 
shale gas development can transport volumes of water between 4,500 and 6,300 gallons 
per load. The volume depends upon the specific models of trucks used by a given 
operator company. At 70 degrees Fahrenheit, the weight of water per gallon equals 
8.3290 pounds. Therefore, a 6,300 gallon tanker truck would carry as much as 52,472.7 
pounds of water. The weight of the water is in addition to the weight of the truck itself, 
which can exceed 28,000 pounds on its own. With truck and water combined, the total 
can often exceed 80,000 pounds, which exceeds the legally allowed maximum weight for 
state and federal highways in both Texas and Pennsylvania. As noted above, to frack a 
single well requires hundreds of truckloads of water, whether a company uses 4,500 
gallon, 6,300 gallon tankers, or something in between. The real variable here is how 
much water each individual well requires in order to successfully hydraulically fracture 
the underlying rock formation. By considering water loads, one can get a general picture 
of the types of damage this traffic can cause. 
According to The Handbook of Highway Engineering by T. F. Fwa, the traditional 
planning of highways, from construction to maintenance, centered on ―considered traffic 
mix repetitions and material properties as the primary input variables for structural 
designs‖ with little to no consideration for environmental effects or material degradation 
or maintenance scheduling over time (Fwa 18.16-17). When such heavy traffic activity 
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like shale gas development – both in overall net tonnage of the vehicles and the 
frequency of that traffic – arrives to a given area, the overall stress placed upon the local 
infrastructure can overwhelm the design in a very short time. Thus, even when companies 
argue that the time period of heaviest activity of drilling in a given area will be limited
49
, 
there will still be substantial damage done to the highway infrastructure, particularly if 
the roads and highways in question were not originally built to standards which will 
support such high axle weights or traffic volumes. As stated in Fwa 2006, ―Heavy traffic 
load repetitions will in all cases accelerate damage caused by environmental factors and 
material degradation.‖50 Therefore, according to Fwa the overall damage sustained by 
road infrastructure in areas of dramatic seasonal weather change will likely be 
considerably higher than otherwise would be the case when the stress of high-volume 
heavy traffic is added.  
The critical point to consider, at least with regard to Marcellus shale development 
as it differs from Barnett shale development, is the overall climate and weather patterns 
involved. Pennsylvania typically has large seasonal changes, which have a dramatic 
effect on road surfaces. Weather and traffic have a tremendous impact on roads. Compare 
this weather-related complication of road maintenance to the seasonal changes in Texas, 
where seasons tend to be considerably less extreme and the weather itself is more 
                                                        
49
 Chesapeake claims that the company is able to drill a typical Barnett Shale gas well in 
about 20 days (―Kennedale‖).  
50
 Fwa goes on to state that ―[t]hermal cracking in concrete slabs can be caused by three 
to four times larger tensile stress due to high temperature differential from the top surface 
to the bottom, compared to the load induced tensile stress. Low temperature thermal 
cracking of asphalt pavements is initiated by very low ambient temperatures. Pothole 
formation during spring-thaw season represents a good example of interaction of three 
mechanisms; load repetitions, weakening of sublayers and roadbed soil, and thaw 
(environmental) conditions‖ (Fwa). 
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conducive to maintaining healthy roads. As established above, when heavy traffic 
volumes and weights interact with climatological effects on road infrastructure, the end 
result is one of substantially higher maintenance and replacement costs. Thus, one would 
expect that, all other variables being equal, Pennsylvania will likely experience even 
greater infrastructure degradation resulting from shale gas development than Texas did in 
its development of the Barnett. 
In the US, the public sector generally builds and maintains transportation 
infrastructure, particularly public highways. Highways have traditionally been the 
primary means of inter- and intra-state goods transport for decades. As public goods, 
roads and highways are generally available for all to use, with relatively few regulations. 
As usage increases, so do the associated costs for maintenance and network expansion, as 
the demand for deeper network penetration and overall road and highway quality 
increases. 
As industrial usage increases, so do the costs of maintenance, particularly as the 
overall tonnage of cargo increases. For example, it stands to reason that a truck carrying 
drilling equipment or water needed for drilling and weighing many tons will degrade road 
surfaces and subsurfaces faster than normal highway traffic, all other variables being 
equal.  
Moreover, such heavy traffic dramatically affects the strength of bridges. As a 
report by the Florida Department of Transportation stated, ―gross weight, axle weight, 
and axle configuration of heavy trucks directly affect the service life of highway bridge 
superstructures‖ (Wang). This is particularly important in Pennsylvania, as there are a 
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tremendous number of bridges in the state, due to the high number of rivers and streams 
throughout the state.  
According to federal guidelines established for the National Interstate System, the 
maximum gross vehicle weight is 80,000 pounds. This weight restriction is further 
limited by per-axle weight limits.
51
 The average weight limit for state highways in Texas 
generally are built to the same standards as federal highways (Luskin and Walton). 
However, on as many as 40% of what are commonly known as ―farm-to-market‖ roads in 
Texas, gross vehicle weight is limited to 58,420 pounds. This justification of this weight 
limit standard is based on the fact that many of these roads were built many years ago, 
prior to the establishment of the current federal highway weight standards. Furthermore, a 
high number of bridges in Texas are load restricted, including as many as 4,000 that were 
built to standards that fail to meet the 58,420 pound standard for the farm-to-market road 
network (Stringer). The county and city roads and highways often fail to meet even the 
considerably lower weight standards of the farm-to-market network of roads. The end 
result of these lower standards amounts to higher levels of wear-and-tear on these 
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 The following is an excerpt from the Federal Highway Administration‘s regulations: 
―658.17 Weight. (a) The provisions of the section are applicable to the National System 
of Interstate and Defense Highways and reasonable access thereto. (b) The maximum 
gross vehicle weight shall be 80,000 pounds except where lower gross vehicle weight is 
dictated by the bridge formula. (c) The maximum gross weight upon any one axle, 
including any one axle of a group of axles, or a vehicle is 20,000 pounds. (d) The 
maximum gross weight on tandem axles is 34,000 pounds. (e) No vehicle or combination 
of vehicles shall be moved or operated on any Interstate highway when the gross weight 
on two or more consecutive axles exceeds the limitations prescribed by the Bridge Gross 
Weight Formula, except that two consecutive sets of tandem axles may carry a gross load 
of 34,000 pounds each if the overall distance between the first and last axle is 36 feet or 
more. In no case shall the total gross weight of a vehicle exceed 80,000 pounds‖ (―CFR-
2008‖).  
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highways, as they simply were not built for the types of tonnage wear caused by the 
water trucks used for water transportation for hydrofracking. 
According to a report published by the Highway Research Board, NAS, in 1962, a 
single 40-ton (80,000 pound) truck does the amount of damage to road and highway 
pavement equivalent to 9,600 passenger cars. While many of the highways that have been 
laid down since 1962 are built according to higher standards than those built at earlier 
points in time, many of the highways and roads, particularly in rural areas, are built to the 
same standards that they always were (―The AASHO Road Test‖).  
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation‘s Highway Cost Allocation 
Study, taxes on excessively heavy trucks – including water trucks and so-called 
―combination trucks‖52 – weighing 80,000 to 100,000 pounds only pay around half of the 
net cost of the wear and damage caused to roads and highways (―Highway Cost‖). The 
report also found a negative correlation between the weight of these super-heavy trucks 
and the amount of damage the taxes assessed actually cover. In other words, as the 
weight of a given truck goes up, the less maintenance the taxes on that truck will actually 
pay for. For example, the study determined that taxes on trucks that weigh 100,000 
pounds and above only pay for approximately 40% of the damage they cause. The result 
amounts to the spreading of maintenance costs to the general public, leading to further 
budgetary pressures (―Addendum‖). 
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 According to BTS Transportation Expressions website, a combination truck is ―a 
tractor pulling at least one full or semi-trailer or a single-unit truck pulling at least one 
trailer. (NHTSA3) (NHTSA4) Consists of a power unit (a truck tractor) and one or more 
trailing units (a semi-trailer or trailer). The most frequently used combination is popularly 
referred to as a ‗tractor-semitrailer‘ or ‗tractor trailer‘. (ATA2) (DOE6)‖ (―Combination 
Truck‖).  
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In 2010, the state of Pennsylvania issued five citations to a single drilling 
contractor, totaling $31,304. The citations were issued because the drilling contractor was 
operating a truck that carried a gross weight of 89.7 tons – 179,400 pounds – despite only 
being registered for 40 tons (Wilber). 
The rural roads and highways where most of the drilling in the Marcellus 
formation will be occurring simply were not designed for either the weight or the volume 
of traffic transported to and from shale gas wells. Even in Texas, where drilling thus far 
has been in comparatively much more urbanized areas, specifically Denton, Tarrant 
counties, roads and highways have suffered much greater rates of degradation than would 
have been the case ordinarily. In both Texas and Pennsylvania, roads and bridges are 
often posted with weight restrictions, to provide indications and warnings of at-risk 
infrastructure.  Companies can often exceed the legal restrictions either by applying for 
variances or securing performance bonds, which require companies to perform or pay for 
maintenance resulting from their activity (―Road Bonding‖). 
2.2.3.2 Recent Road News 
Pennsylvania has already seen substantial drilling activity in some rural areas. In 
fact, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) revoked permits for 
Chesapeake Energy‘s use of four state-maintained highways in northwest Pennsylvania 
(―Gas Business‖). According to the regulations specific to the roads in question, the 
weight limit is capped at 10 tons. However, Chesapeake was granted a variance to move 
the necessary equipment and water into areas like Bradford County for hydrofracking 
shale wells. The variance stipulated that Chesapeake "proactively monitor[s] pavement 
conditions and immediately begin[s] repairs as needed to keep the road safe." According 
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to its website, PennDot suspended Chesapeake‘s usage permits due to the company‘s 
failure to deal with severe roadway damage caused by its drilling activities.  
Under the terms of the use permit, Chesapeake is to "proactively monitor 
pavement conditions and immediately begin repairs as needed to keep the road safe," the 
website announcement says. Despite the normal10-ton weight restriction, Chesapeake‘s 
permits allowed the movement of considerably heavier vehicles and equipment on the 
roads in question so long as the company would be responsible for repairs to damages 
caused by their the additional traffic and weight loads. 
2.2.3.3 Conclusion 
Based on the available literature, it is clear that heavy trucks, carrying even 
heavier equipment, travelling on roads not designed to accommodate such heavy loads, 
and doing so many hundreds, or even thousands of times, leads inexorably to dramatic 
degradation of local road and highway infrastructure. This damage can be mitigated, but 
remediation and repair can be expensive. This is particularly true if the culprits shirk 
responsibilities for maintenance, or are never required to do so in the first place. While 
the damage to roads and highways associated with well development cannot be fully 
avoided, it absolutely can be minimized and repaired after the fact. Thus, road and 
highway infrastructure damage represents a critical associated negative externality of 
shale gas development that state and local policies can effectively address. 
2.2.3.4 Water Usage 
While it would be beyond the scope of this work to develop a stand-alone set of 
water usage estimates, much of the data needed, and the projection estimates from those 
data were designed and compiled in a 2007 study by Bene and Harden, under the name 
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Northern Trinity/Woodbine Aquifer Groundwater Availability Model: Assessment of 
Groundwater Use in the Northern Trinity Aquifer Due to Urban Growth and Barnett 
Shale Development. The report projected water usage in the Barnett based on projected 
growth models, none of which proved accurate compared to how development actually 
proceeded in the Barnett.
53
 Unfortunately, this particular study deviates greatly from what 
actually occurred. However, this study provides considerable insight into how to establish 
reliable projections for water usage. 
While the Bene and Harden study focused narrowly on the Northern Trinity and 
Woodbine Aquifers in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, the study specifically addressed both 
urban growth and Barnett shale development. This aligns well with addressing the 
microeconomic developments arising from water usage.
54
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 Undoubtedly, much of the stunting of development in the Barnett, and thus the 
deviation from the models within the Bene and Harden report was the direct result of the 
economic downturn that began in 2008. While it is difficult to estimate the degree to 
which Barnett development suffered as a result of the economic recession, it is clear that 
a large portion of the decline in activity was due to the collapse in natural gas prices that 
was precipitated by the economic downturn. The collapse in natural gas prices greatly 
reduced the profitability of drilling new wells in the Barnett. In fact, the price of natural 
gas still has not recovered to pre-recession levels. As such, Barnett development likewise 
has not recovered to pre-recession levels. Thus, the Bene and Harden models failed to 
accurately predict Barnett development mostly because their models did not presupposed 
or predict exogenous price shocks like the subprime collapse. 
54
 The Bene and Harden study based its research upon a groundwater availability model 
originally developed for the northern Trinity Aquifer and combined with data gathered by 
surveys designed and mailed by Freese and Nichols, Inc., which mailed the surveys to 
123 water entities in their study area. The survey ―inquired about water use since 2000, 
particularly focusing on water use in the Trinity aquifer.  Forty-seven percent of the 
recipients participated in the survey…. The information provided by these entities helped 
establish the historical water use in the Trinity aquifer. … Some entities have made 
agreements to purchase surface water and plan to decrease their dependence on the 
Trinity aquifer. Others plan to continue using the Trinity aquifer as their sole water 
supply‖ (Bene et al. 1-1).  
  60 
These projections fell into three separate categories, all based upon proposed well 
completions in the Barnett, and were labeled ―low,‖ ―medium,‖ and ―high‖ to coincide 
with the projections based upon historical well completion numbers in the Barnett. In 
comparing the projections to actual data from 2008 onward, the projections deviated 
significantly from actual well completion. The low projection, for example, overstates the 
expected number of 2010 well completions by 432 new wells spud, or 40.4%. 
The study projections were based upon the market conditions at the time of the 
study, which preceded the global economic collapse and the subsequent drop in natural 
gas prices. Barnett shale development, like all hydrocarbon development, is heavily 
dependent upon market prices. Production may not make good economic or financial 
sense if the cost of the end product is not high enough. In this case, few in the financial 
markets warned against the possibility of such an exogenous shock to the overall energy 
markets.  
In addition, the volumes of water this study used understated the volumes of water 
being used to drill and frack the Barnett wells. When compared to the Chesapeake 
Energy estimates, the numbers used in the Bene and Harden study understate the volume 
of water needed per well by as much an 1.2 million gallons of water.
55
  
It should also be noted that re-fracking of the first horizontal wells from the early 
2000s has commenced (―U.S. Shale Gas‖). This in essence amounts to repeating the same 
process that originally occurred to develop the well. The major difference is that the well 
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 Chesapeake Energy has published numerous estimates for water usage in both the 
Barnett play and the Marcellus. The estimates referred to here are the ones that deal 
specifically to the Barnett. 
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itself has already been drilled, and the process focuses on opening new fractures in the 
source rock below. Refracking was not accounted for in the Bene and Harden study.  
According to this study, ―[d]uring a drought, there is increased pressure on water 
supplies to support increased irrigation and other demands. While conservation measures 
can eventually reduce overall consumption, increased groundwater use can initially occur 
during dry weather conditions‖ (Bene and Harden 27). Thus, it is important to recognize 
that drought conditions may not reduce industrial usage until after substantial stores of 
groundwater have already been used. 
  According to a 2007 study, all water in Texas that ―flows in creeks, rivers, and 
bays is owned and managed by the State‖ (Nicot and Potter). Accordingly, any person or 
concern withdrawing surface water ―for mining, construction, and oil or gas activities 
must obtain a water rights permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
(TCEQ).‖ It is unclear if this regulation is uniformly enforced. Based on the discrepancy 
between the numbers reported to the TCEQ and the figures released by various drilling 
companies, the potential for underreporting exists. This has been bolstered by anecdotal 
evidence by officials in the Barnett area.
56
 This water source change – from one easily 
trackable, to many that are not – would explain why the numbers available officially and 
the numbers released in press releases by companies differ greatly. 
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 According to Denton, TX officials, many of the companies who had been purchasing 
water from the City of Denton secured arrangements with private landowners to use their 
collected surface water, in order to reduce the costs associated with purchasing water 
from a municipality (Nickerson).  
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A number of recycling companies have become active in these shale plays.
57
 
However, these recycling technologies had not been put into action on any large scale in 
the Barnett until recently – from 2008 onward. Hence, these technologies will alter the 
overall projections of water usage moving forward – particularly in plays that have not 
yet experienced the larger portion of development – but they have not heavily affected 
water usage in the Barnett play to date. Nicot and Potter went on to conclude that, while 
the recycling technology is proven and available, the practice of recycling would take 
time to before it would cause a significant effect on water usage.  
As was the case in Texas for the Barnett development, such considerable volumes 
of water necessary for developing the Marcellus play could well play havoc with 
groundwater supplies, particularly under conditions of drought or areas with over-taxed 
water systems. This was the case in Texas recently when Texas experienced sustained 
periods of drought.
58
 
In addition to this, drilling companies will be required to truck in much of the 
water necessary for this development. While Pennsylvania, unlike Texas, enjoys 
substantial and reliable water sources, the magnitude of the Marcellus shale development 
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 Some recycling companies capable of addressing the issues specific to shale gas 
development include companies like Ecosphere Technologies or Fountain Quail. 
Fountain Quail did not become active in the Barnett play until 2005, at which point it 
began with a single field unit and tested its evaporation method south of the town of 
Decatur, in Wise County. The first was initiated in Wise County, south of Decatur, by 
Fountain Quail Water Management in 2005. DTE Gas Resources also became active in 
the Barnett in 2005. Ecosphere did not become active in the Barnett play until 2008. 
There are other companies also active in the Barnett (―RIGZONE,‖ ―Water recycling‖).  
58
 Texas is currently experiencing its worst drought in decades. U.S. Drought Monitor, a 
non-profit effort at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, categorizes the current drought 
conditions in Texas as ―exceptional,‖ their worst designation (McFerron and Campbell, 
―US Drought Monitor‖).  
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may make that a moot point simply because of the sheer enormity of the volumes of 
water involved and the increased chance of groundwater contamination that such 
extensive development will entail. Much of the water to be used in the Marcellus will 
simply be collected from rivers, streams, ponds, and wells. Due to the urban nature of the 
Barnett play, where operator companies could purchase water from municipalities as well 
as take surface water or drill their own wells, and the rural nature of the Marcellus play, 
the simple fact of the matter is that there will likely be substantially greater amounts of 
traffic resulting from Marcellus development, as opposed to Barnett development. 
Moreover, that traffic will likely do more damage because of the comparably less-well-
engineered roads in Pennsylvania‘s rural areas. 
2.3 A Political Crossroads: What Path Should Pennsylvania Take? 
2.3.1 Severance Taxes vs. Natural Resource Funds 
 As mentioned previously, severance taxes can function in many ways like NRFs. 
This is mostly related to how the money ends up being implemented from a policy 
standpoint. However, severance taxes differ on a major, if overlooked point that makes 
all the difference in the world: separate management. 
 Just as in the financial world, commingling of funds generally never leads to 
positive results. By allowing severance proceeds to reside in the general fund, there are 
simply too many incentives – political, economic, financial – for policymakers to pass up 
using that revenue for general purposes. This leads to the possibility of the government in 
question falling into the trap of allowing those revenues to feed into the resource curse 
negative feedback loop: expansion of services during boom times, deficit/debt –funded 
spending in lean times. This negative feedback loop results in no long-term benefit from 
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the windfall of resource extraction royalties, due to disincentives to save general fund 
revenues and the natural business cycles that lead to commodity price volatility. 
 NRFs provide a number of protections from these pitfalls. First, by sequestering 
the funds, there is no comingling of funds, and therefore no completely surreptitious way 
to spend those funds. Second, if established properly, the NRF provides a responsive and 
responsible administration of those revenues in a politically fair and palatable manner. 
While an NRF is only as effective as its charter and initial (or even subsequent) tasking, it 
provides considerably more protection and oversight over the use of royalty revenues. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Rationale for the Research and Current Status of the Problem 
The ongoing search for relatively inexpensive energy sources has led to the 
development of new technologies, enabling access to previously unusable resources. The 
recent boom in shale gas development has only happened because of these new 
technologies coupled with older technologies, making shale gas an economically viable 
energy option. However, shale gas plays, like some other unconventional hydrocarbon 
plays, exhibit comparably steep extraction curves. The nature of these plays lends itself to 
initially higher rates of extraction with subsequent precipitous production collapses. 
Such sharp changes potentially create or exacerbate boom-bust cycles and their 
attendant economic problems. Shale gas development is also a young and poorly 
understood process, the environmental and geological effects of which have scarcely 
been considered. However, much research is being conducted to determine precisely 
what the effects may be. A recent example of this push to develop without waiting to 
understand the consequences is the micro-tremor problem in the Fayetteville shale 
formation, which seem to be directly linked to fracking activity in the region (Robertson). 
This research has a specific focus on the budgetary issues that may arise as a 
result of shale gas development – specifically, the economic impact of shale gas drilling 
as measured through road infrastructure and water management.  
3.2 Statement of the research objectives 
The present research paper has the objective to investigate the need for 
Pennsylvania to establish a state gas fund in anticipation of budgetary and 
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microeconomic complications arising from the development of the Marcellus shale 
formation.  
3.3 Research Question 
The research question for this thesis is as follows: 
Does the development of natural gas shale reserves create the conditions for the 
development of negative economic externalities?  
If so, can these attendant economic problems be effectively managed and 
mitigated by the creation of a natural resource fund (or ―gas fund‖)? 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Barnett Shale Formation 
Data for this research is focused primarily on the Barnett shale formation in 
Texas. The Barnett development is the most mature development of a shale gas field in 
the world. Most of the current techniques in the field of natural gas extraction were 
developed there. The Barnett play has been steadily and seriously developed since 1999. 
The Barnett can provide meaningful guidance in terms of what one might expect moving 
forward with new plays. At minimum, it can provide a case against which new 
production and development may be compared. The Barnett should provide a good 
baseline test case upon which to construct a model for future unconventional hydrocarbon 
plays. 
While other shale gas plays in the United States (including the Marcellus, the 
Haynesville, and the Fayetteville) have seen considerable interest and development, the 
Barnett remains the most well-established with the largest amount of readily available 
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data. Moreover, the Barnett has become the basis for projections in the Marcellus 
formation. The precedent has been established by Engelder and Lash (volume 
projections) and Considine (economic benefits) (Engelder and Lash, Considine et al. ―An 
Emerging Giant‖).  
Where applicable, data analysis is confined to the years 2000 and 2007. Where 
data is not readily available annually, or showed a standard curve/rate of growth through 
that time period, the beginning and end dates were used exclusively. Pre-2000 data is not 
relevant because using directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing together, which makes 
shale gas exploration economically viable, was not used before 2000. Starting with 2000 
data enables the research to view the Barnett shale play in its infancy. The year 2007 was 
chosen as a stopping point because the 2008 housing collapse and economic recession 
had the potential to skew data for reasons completely unrelated to shale gas development. 
In addition, the curve of the extraction volume in the Barnett becomes 
unpredictable after 2007. Because this research aims to focus on issues relevant to 
Marcellus formation start-up, the changing curve would only serve to confuse the issues 
at hand. Figures 4-5 depict the growth of active wells and extraction volume (gas and 
condensates) from 2000-2010, illustrating this issue.  
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Figure 4. Total Monthly Extracted Gas Volume (MCF) in Barnett Play 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Texas Railroad Commission 
Figure 5. Total Monthly Extracted Condensate Volume (BBL) in Barnett Play 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Texas Railroad Commission 
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3.4.2 County breakdown 
Initial population data is viewed for all variables at the county level. The Barnett 
shale formation is centered on four counties (referred to as the ―core‖ counties – Denton, 
Johnson, Tarrant, and Wise counties).
59
 All data tables in this research will include these 
four counties. In addition, initial tables in the transportation section will reference the 
seventeen counties adjacent to them (referred to as the ―peripheral‖ counties – Bosque, 
Clay, Comanche, Cooke, Coryell, Dallas, Eastland, Ellis, Erath, Hamilton, Hill, Hood, 
Jack, Montague, Palo Pinto, Parker, and Somervell counties) as well as other counties in 
the state with a population of 40,000 and above (a total of 68 of the state‘s 254 
counties).
60
  Table 5 lists the counties and their 2000 and 2007 populations.  
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 Between January 2000 and December 2010, the core counties had 12,387/15,644 shale 
gas wells in the state (79.2%) and 7,697,860,795 MCF/8,672,219,628 MCF production in 
the state (88.8%). 
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 The 40,000 cutoff point is rounded down from the 2000 population of Wise County 
(45,094). These 68 counties had a 2000 population total of 17,733,620/20,190,519 in the 
state (87.8%).  
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Table 5. Study Counties (Barnett Shale Play) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3 Independent variables 
The goal of the research question is to determine whether, how, and by how much 
the hydrocarbon industry development affects the local and state economies in which it 
occurs. While the possible ways to address and measure such changes are manifold, this 
study focuses specifically upon budgetary and microeconomic effects stemming from 
shale gas development – specifically road infrastructure damage and the fair market value 
of water usage. It is exceedingly clear from the available literature that extractive 
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industries create substantial externalities – both positive and negative – for the states, 
regions, and localities in which development occurs. Therefore, the intent here is to 
determine a reliable means of calculating those effects. Data for the number of wells 
used, the volume of gas extracted, and volume of condensates extracted is used to 
determine how the size of the play affects immediate localities.
61
 These three variables 
are the primary independent variables in this research, the combination of which will 
provide the tools necessary to create both descriptive and predictive models.
62
  In theory, 
production on a small scale will have a comparably smaller effect upon the surrounding 
area than production on a larger scale, which would both be necessitated and indicated by 
larger per well volumes. The larger the scale of the production, the more complicated the 
policy and budgetary implications will be. In this way, the number of wells drilled and 
the volume extracted provide a solid basis for comparison, and a credible representation 
of level of development. 
3.4.4 Dependent variables 
 Shale gas has a quick but expensive initial development period, and exhibits steep 
depletion curves. This compressed timeline for play development lends itself to what 
amounts to faster, more capital-intensive development for localities (McFarland, Nuttall). 
While a given state as a whole may not necessarily experience budgetary complications 
on a large scale, localities often experience micro boom/bust cycles. The potential for 
many pockets of extreme deindustrialization, increased service load, and higher traffic 
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 For example, higher volume extracted per well drilled generally indicates greater 
wellpad size, overall displacement, and a higher number of workers operating the site.  
62
 Data on wells and production volume is obtained from the Texas Railroad Commission 
(TRRC). Texas requires reporting of extractable volume at the wellhead for both oil and 
natural gas extraction to the TRRC. This is the primary and most accurate data source for 
well numbers and production volume in Texas. 
  72 
should be addressed before local areas are negatively impacted. Since this work is limited 
to considering two specific types of negative externalities, the variables will reflect this 
focus. The variables considered, then, include projected infrastructure costs and expenses 
as well as projected water usage and estimated fair market values of water used. 
3.4.4.1 Infrastructure 
One of the most identifiable effects hydrocarbon development can have on a 
given locality is the increase in traffic on roads and highways. For shale gas, the problem 
is amplified because of the transportation of clean water to well sites for the fracking 
process, and removal of flowback water for disposal. Unless pipeline infrastructure exists 
for these purposes, tanker trucks must be used. Due to the realities of both shale gas 
development and basic capital infrastructure in the U.S. – truncated development cycles 
when compared to oil, leading to relatively short and punctuated local development, as 
well as a lack of dedicated water or gas transmission pipelines as is the case in most areas 
of shale gas development in the U.S. – high numbers of truckloads is an accurate 
assumption with regard to shale gas development.  
Road infrastructure will likely be one of the greatest immediate and ongoing 
attendant costs associated with shale gas development. It will also be the most readily 
observable and measurable, and could potentially affect the greatest number of people. 
Operator companies have taken to avoiding state and county roads in both Texas and 
Pennsylvania wherever possible. The resultant pressure on local roads is magnified 
because non-state and non-county roads must be maintained with local tax receipts. Local 
roads also do not generally meet the same standards for usage or tonnage that state or 
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county roads must meet. Because of these factors, infrastructure degradation can be more 
extreme on already lower-quality roads.  
By keeping to local roads, operator companies shift the maintenance burden to 
localities, which have proportionally less power than the state as a whole. With smaller 
constituencies and fewer observers in general, the negative externality of infrastructure 
degradation gets less direct attention and therefore less funding than such a problem 
might ordinarily warrant.  
Despite these potential problems, Texas has developed long-standing 
relationships with oil and gas developers at both the state and local levels. Well-
established laws and regulations are also present. Moreover, the overall quality of roads 
in Texas is high.
63
 This is due in part to the relatively road-friendly climate in Texas, 
where temperatures rarely dip far below freezing. General maintenance necessary for 
repairing climate induced damage is minimal compared to northern states. Despite Texas‘ 
proportionally higher taxpayer burdens for high-quality roads, this also indicates both a 
willingness on the part of Texas policymakers to prioritize highway expenditures and an 
uncanny responsiveness to concerns arising from complications in highway 
transportation.  
Data chosen for highway costs comes from the Texas Department of 
Transportation‘s District and County Statistics (DISCOS) reports, which provides data 
relating to roads, highways, bridges, and aviation (―DISCOS‖). Data relating to number 
of registered vehicles – public monies spent on new construction, repair, and maintenance 
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 According to reason.org‘s 19th Annual Report on the Performance of State Highway 
Systems (2010), Texas ranks 13
th
 overall, indicating proportionally better overall 
outcomes, despite low marks in total disbursements (36
th
) and urban interstate congestion 
(37
th
). 
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of existing roads – is used for this research. The transportation maintenance budget must, 
by its very nature, be a lagging indicator of problems. That being said, it is an indicator 
only in direct proportion to how responsive the government in question happens to be to 
such problems, and how strong the imbedded constituency for such an amenity happens 
to be. In Texas‘ case, the state legislature seems to be highly responsive, and the built-in 
constituency likewise seems rather sensitive to worsening highway conditions.  It remains 
to be seen how effective this variable will prove to be when applying it to other shale gas 
developments. 
While the number of cases for each group, particularly the core group, limit 
greatly the degree to which any inferential techniques can be brought to bear, one can still 
get a rather clear picture of what has happened in these areas by looking at the numbers. 
The lack of inferential statistical analysis limits the degree to which one can establish a 
multivariate causal model, but the observations themselves can provide considerable 
insight into how extractive industries – and shale gas in particular – will pan out 
elsewhere. 
The study of infrastructure costs in Texas requires considering actual dollars spent 
on maintenance. Unfortunately, Texas funds its infrastructure at a number of levels. 
While the state provides funding for state highways via federal money and state taxes, the 
counties are responsible for maintaining county roads, and towns and cities are, by and 
large, required to service the roads that fall within their jurisdiction. The Texas 
Department of Transportation (TXDOT) collects data on funding, but it does not include 
local funding, or even all county funding. Despite this, the DISCOS data provided by the 
TXDOT remains the best alternative for data on highway maintenance, as the data is 
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collected uniformly across the state. While data on county and city maintenance does 
exist, there are many formats and measures that do not necessarily make for easy 
comparisons. The DISCOS data, while incomplete with respect to localities and some 
county funding, is the best and most uniform data available. 
The best way to address this issue is to compare actual maintenance costs, 
measured in dollars per lane mile. TXDOT breaks out total maintenance costs, as well as 
provides total lane miles by county. Therefore, in order to determine cost per lane mile, 
the computation is a simple matter of dividing total dollars spent by the number of miles 
of state-funded highway found within each county.  
This variable will ideally prove that shale gas development has a substantially 
greater overall effect on local and state budgets than has been presumed up to this point. 
It should serve as an indicator for policymakers to take greater care in considering more 
broadly the attendant effects of such large-scale, but relatively one-dimensional, 
economic activities.   
3.4.4.2 Water 
 
Fracking can use either surface water or groundwater as a source.  Currently, it is 
estimated that companies use groundwater approximately 60% of the time, with county-
wide averages ranging from about 45% to 90% (Bene et al.). While the majority of the 
water used in the Barnett shale development came from groundwater sources (Byrd), a 
substantial amount still was either purchased from municipalities or taken from surface 
water sources (Nickerson). 
Despite substantially more monitoring of water usage in the Barnett by the Texas 
Water Development Board (TWDB) and other semi-public entities – particularly 
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important considering both how much water is used in fracking and the extent to which 
droughts afflict Texas water supplies – the situation in the Barnett still does not present 
an optimal solution. There are literally thousands of water providers in Texas. There 
remains no central storehouse of data for water usage, unlike the Texas Railroad 
Commission‘s (RRC) tracking of gas production. This lack of centralization of statistics 
regarding water usage has made the data gathering challenging. 
Therefore, using the projections adapted from the Bene, et al. study, one can 
estimate microeconomic effects, using the municipal rates available from Tarrant and 
Denton counties.
64
 Once these basic guidelines and estimations have been devised, this 
methodology will then be projected for the Marcellus play. 
Since the Bene, et al. projections fail to provide an accurate estimate of water 
volume in regard to drilling, a new model must be devised. Currently a number of 
companies can effectively recycle flowback water to a degree that some can be reused, up 
to 80% of captured flowback water (―Welcome to Fountain Quail‖). If approximately 
70% of the water used to frack a horizontally drilled well returns, and 80% of that water 
can be reused, the asymptotic function approaches zero after only 8 cycles. The result of 
this is an increase of 127% efficiency in terms of the amount of water that can be used. In 
other words, if 100 gallons are used initially, it equals a total of approximately 227 
gallons of water that can be used for fracking, or an additional 127 gallons over and 
above the original 100 gallons (―Water Use‖).  
                                                        
64
 The intent here is to determine fair market value for the water. By employing the 
pricing structure used by the biggest municipal water providers in the area, it provides 
relatively accurate estimates of what private users should be paying for water usage. 
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The nature of both water use projections and drilling – with newer and better 
technologies altering the operational calculus almost constantly – complicate the task of 
determining the impact of Barnett Shale production on groundwater. Water used for 
fracking can be found practically anywhere, from groundwater, surface water, municipal 
sources, or recycling previously used water. Still, transporting water in from elsewhere – 
even if the distances are relatively small – can become very expensive very quickly. 
Therefore, developing and instituting better recycling technologies is a high priority for 
operating companies as a means of both minimizing costs for water usage further and 
providing a better public façade for the water usage issue in general. Indeed, the 
additional demand pressure that drilling imposes upon the supply of water will likely 
become a high priority for localities as well. 
The Barnett and the Marcellus formations will require different amounts of water 
in order to frack. While a Marcellus well averages about 3 million gallons per frack,
65
 a 
well in the Barnett averages about 4.5 million gallons per frack (―Barnett Shale 
Production‖). This is because Marcellus shale tends to run shallower than Barnett shale, 
and deeper plays require greater amounts of water to frack a well. Also, the rules and 
regulations regarding drilling in Pennsylvania require fewer frack stages in the Marcellus, 
thus requiring less water.
66
 A typical Marcellus well usually requires completions that 
involve multi-stage fracks with more than three stages per well (―US Shale Gas‖).  
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 According to a 2008 study done by John Harper of the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Topographic and Geologic Survey, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, 
―a horizontal well completion might use more than 3 million gallons‖ of water for a 
successful single-stage frac job.  
66
 In wells with multiple frac stages, each successive frac stage generally requires more 
water than the previous stage, due to the length or depth of the well being drilled, as well 
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However, some observers
67
 anticipate larger total volumes of water in the 
Marcellus. Even if the Marcellus wells tend to require less water for each well, there will 
likely be more wells drilled in the Marcellus. The Marcellus is both richer and larger than 
the Barnett play, and is more dense. Because of the Marcellus source rock‘s 
comparatively higher organic content,
68
 the projections for total gas extractions anticipate 
considerably higher gas extraction volumes, also likely to require more water for 
extraction. 
It should be noted here that, even with the projections for potential extractable gas 
from the Marcellus, there are a bevy of estimates for the number of wells needed to fully 
exploit the resource.
69
 However, this model is designed to provide broad estimates. As 
with the other models established in the work, it is very sensitive to the inputs of the 
variables. In this case, using the lifetime per-well estimate from the Barnett very well 
may not be accurate, because the Marcellus seems to be producing considerably more 
gas, under considerably more pressure, than the Barnett wells. Therefore, going forward, 
this model will necessarily need to be tweaked in order to provide ongoing accurate 
projections as technology and more data become available. 
This model is meant to provide new insights into ways in which one can more 
accurately and fairly determine the damage to infrastructure being caused by drilling 
                                                                                                                                                                     
as the additional pressure from previous fracs dissipating into previously fracked shale 
rock. 
67
 Even Chesapeake, one of the major operator companies in the Marcellus, is estimating 
very high water volumes. Most recently, the company released a fact sheet that used the 
volume of 5.6 million gallons as an average volume of water needed to successfully drill 
and hydrofrac Marcellus shale gas wells (―Water Use Fact Sheet‖).  
68
 Typically, higher organic content in shale results in higher potential extractable 
hydrocarbon volume. This is generally the case with both oil and natural gas shale. 
69
 Moors‘ estimate or 110,000-220,000 wells, for example. 
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activities. While this author feels that it is a rather accurate assessment of the problem, 
there will always be room for improvement to the model. The model itself is an 
abstraction, an attempt to aggregate the damage overall, rather than to determine point 
damage to specific roads and highways at specific times. Moreover, this research is 
meant to be the beginning of much more future research, rather than a terminus, and it 
should be received with that in mind. 
There will undoubtedly be criticism of this work, and not undeservedly. Some of 
the core assumptions, particularly the traffic equivalency measure, need to be updated so 
as to provide a more timely and recent assessment of road damage based on the newest 
data and construction techniques. That being said, no updated research has been found 
after 1962, and therefore represents the weakest portion of this model.  
However, it should be noted that while the study may or may not prove to provide 
the most recent and accurate assessments of damage equivalencies, that is simply a matter 
of altering inputs to the model, rather than undermining the model‘s design itself. Once 
new engineering research has been performed, this model should become even more 
robust, and its results even more valuable to policymakers.  
Furthermore, it should also be noted that the entire intent behind this research is to 
provide actionable analysis for policymakers, or at very least a framework for analysis 
within which policymakers can make more informed and fairer decisions regarding 
policy.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
4.1 Roads 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
Road infrastructure damage is probably the most visible initial effect of shale gas 
development, particularly if the development is rural in nature. While any casual 
bystander can witness the comings and goings of oversized loads trucking in water, sand, 
and equipment, the clearly observable residual effects of this development tend to 
manifest as broken pavement, cracked or bent bridge trusses, or even completely 
destroyed roadbeds. Even in urban settings, where the roads and highways tend to be 
newer – and often better built and maintained due to the higher traffic patterns – the 
amount of damage can be substantial. The following sections describe and explain the 
road infrastructure results from analyzing development from the Barnett, as well as 
projections based upon the best estimates for usage in the Marcellus. 
4.1.2 Barnett 
 
4.1.2.1 Annual well completions 
 
Table 6 shows the number of wells completed in the four core counties of the 
Barnett formation during the two years examined for this research. No substantial amount 
of development occurred in any of the counties in 2000 relative to what occurred later; 
therefore, that year functions as the baseline. The development that had occurred prior to 
that point in time consisted almost solely of vertical wells, since this period predates the 
convergence of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Hence, the tremendous 
amounts of water, sand, chemicals, and equipment needed to hydraulically fracture and 
directionally drill those wells had not yet factored in to the overall road infrastructure 
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maintenance costs. Since Texas has been a major producer of petroleum and natural gas 
for a number of decades prior to the advent of shale gas development, the state had 
already factored into the road maintenance calculations much, if not all, of the projected 
costs associated with conventional hydrocarbon production. 
Production in Johnson County, the last of the four ―core‖ counties in the Barnett 
formation, had not yet begun in 2000 despite the fact that development had begun in the 
other three core counties. There is a substantial difference in the amount of development 
taking place in 2007 as compared to 2000.  The year 2007 represents the peak year of 
well completions for the Barnett formation. Of note is that Johnson County‘s production 
began in 2003, and that county is considerably less populated than Denton and Tarrant 
counties. Hence, Johnson County provides a situation of extremely high development 
compressed in a comparably short period of time, which provides us with an opportunity 
to observe an extremely high rate of development over time compared to the other core 
counties. These data were the basis for determining overall activity in the core Barnett 
counties, as the entire model stems from determining a per well measure of activity. 
Table 6. Annual Well Completions (Barnett) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note that as of the end of 2007 Johnson County represents almost 44% – 43.93%     
 to be precise – of all shale gas development within the core counties.  
 
4.1.2.2 Truck trip calculations 
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Table 7 shows an estimate of the number of trips necessary to drill and frack the 
wells in each core county during the subject years. The calculations are based on the 
assumption that each well requires an average of 3 million gallons of water. Even at an 
average of only 3 million gallons of water per well and at relatively low levels of 
development, the result in terms of increased traffic can be enormous, and potentially 
enough to simply overwhelm the infrastructure of various localities. These trucks, often 
weighing 20 times as much as regular cars, can damage roads to a much greater degree 
than their weight would suggest. Because the weight of the trucks often exceeds the 
weight limits of these roads and highways by orders of magnitude, the stress these trucks 
place upon roadways affects the underlying infrastructure more than merely looking at 
truck trips and mileage. Even for purposes of this research, conservative estimates were 
employed so as not to potentially overstate the effects associated with shale gas 
development. The following calculations are based on research by the Highway Research 
Board (―Advocates‖), which determined that a single 40-ton (80,000 pound) tractor-
trailer truck imposes as much damage on highways as 9,600 average-sized passenger 
cars. 
Table 7. Number of Drilling Truck Trips (3 million gallon estimate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 illustrates the number of truck trips based on an average of 4.5 million 
gallons of water (the high estimate). Like the estimates in the table above, these numbers 
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are based on research by the Highway Research Board and further illustrate the issues 
evident at an average of 3 million gallons per well. Together, these numbers provide a 
baseline range to consider for calculating overall infrastructural damage, particularly 
when looking at other more water- and equipment-intensive shale plays. 
Table 8. Number of Drilling Truck Trips (4.5 million gallon estimate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2.3 Equivalent vehicle numbers 
 
Table 9 below establishes equivalency figures for the two average water volumes, 
which provides the likely damage range. The figures in Table 9 were calculated by 
multiplying the estimated number of truck trips required to develop the wells sunk in the 
respective years (at 3 million and 4.5 million gallons of water respectively) by the 
number of estimated equivalent cars, and then divided by 365. Since the product of the 
estimated number of trips and the passenger car equivalency factor would seem to 
potentially overstate the damage incurred by the roads as a result of shale gas 
development, that product must be tempered by the fact that the trucks in question do not 
represent permanent new daily vehicles, but rather only single discrete trips. Therefore, in 
order to temper the calculation of the numerator product, this study assumes that the truck 
trips in question represent a single day‘s travel. By dividing the numerator product by the 
number of days in the year, a more conservative estimate of additional traffic that shale 
gas development imposes on the local infrastructure is determined. 
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Table 9. Equivalent Vehicle Numbers (3 and 4.5 million gallon estimates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2.4 Drilling adjusted vehicle numbers 
 
Tables 10-11 show the numbers calculated by adding the estimated additional 
traffic resulting from shale gas development to the data provided by TXDOT related to 
registered vehicles. Both the equivalent registered vehicles (from a traffic standpoint) and 
the additional estimated damage to local and state infrastructure are shown. These 
calculations provide us with an estimated range of the unfunded damage incurred by 
roads. 
Table 10. Unfunded Damage (3 million gallon estimates) 
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Table 11. Unfunded Damage (4.5 million gallon estimates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2.5 Costs, overfunding, and unfunded damage estimates 
 
From the data collected and analyzed on the 68 total counties of this study, it 
became clear that the state of Texas has attempted to fund – at least partially – the repair 
of infrastructure damage inflicted upon state highways by shale gas development. Since 
this data made it clear that the core counties had received, on average, more funding for 
road and highway repair from the state, even after controlling for population and increase 
in registered vehicles, the remaining analysis will focus only on the four core counties of 
Denton, Johnson, Tarrant, and Wise.  
The goal of this research is to provide a clear model for policymakers to employ 
in order to accurately assess compensatory taxation or appropriate user fees. By far, the 
great majority of unconventional gas extraction in Texas has occurred in the four core 
counties. By focusing on these four counties only, the results will be extremely clear and 
more easily applicable for policymakers. Therefore, a fairer value for repair can be 
determined by calculating a more accurate level of damage done and for which taxation 
had not compensated the state and localities.  
What should also be noted is that most trucking traffic for shale gas development, 
by its very nature, occurs on local highways and roads. While state highways are often 
built to higher engineering standards than local highways, that greater robustness and 
capability to withstand more and heavier traffic means little if the greatest volumes of 
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traffic occur on other roads and highways. This is one of the primary reasons the city of 
Denton opted to assess local usage fees for drilling in the Barnett.
70
 Yet, despite these 
additional fees, the money collected goes toward only the thoroughfares in Denton city 
proper. According to Keith Gabbard, Street and Drainage Superintendent of the City of 
Denton, Denton has collected approximately $1.5 million in usage fees (Gabbard). While 
that money has gone quite a ways toward mitigating the damage from Barnett drilling 
within Denton city limits, it by no means paid for it all, particularly in light of the price 
increases for oil-related products like asphalt since the fee was made policy.  
It should also be noted that the following data does not include the specific local 
data on infrastructure spending in Texas. The focus on this research is to address state 
budgetary policy concerns. While local infrastructure expenditures will likely affect the 
following calculations to some minor degree, the intent is to show the magnitude of 
difference between what is being spent currently and what should be spent. Therefore, 
while the county data are likely available, the overall effect on the discrepancy between 
county and local expenditures on the one hand, and actual under-funded and un-funded 
damage on the other is likely to be rather small, as indicated by the amount of money 
collected by way of usage fees (and the fact that these usage fees have proven 
insufficient) by the City of Denton. 
Table 12 shows the number of vehicles registered in each of the four core 
counties, as well as data called Drilling-Adjusted Vehicle Numbers (DAVN). The DAVN 
refer to the equivalent car traffic represented by drilling. The DAVN is calculated by first 
                                                        
70 Denton was chosen as the main locality of research for two primary reasons. First, 
Denton experienced the earliest and greatest amount of development in the Barnett until 
very recently, and second, the accessibility of personnel and their willingness to discuss 
the topic of Barnett shale development made the research task a much less tedious one. 
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multiplying the estimated passenger car equivalent, 9,600
71
, by the average number of 
truck trips necessary to drill and frack the number of wells spud in a given year. Since 
that calculation does not accurately model truck behavior as it occurs in the field – each 
discrete truck trip should be counted as a single trip on a single day, rather than 
multiplied out over an entire year‘s worth of traffic – the product must be altered to more 
accurately represent the actual behavior of trucks. Otherwise, the product could 
potentially vastly overstate the level of activity in question. This model uses the number 
of days in a single year as an adjustment factor.  The product of the estimated passenger 
car equivalent and the average number of truck trips necessary to drill and frack the 
number of wells spud in a given year is divided by 365. The resulting number gives a 
more conservative, and likely more accurate, estimation of the actual traffic. 
While the average well in the Barnett has required approximately 3 million 
gallons of water to drill and frack, it makes sense to calculate the damage based upon that 
volume of water – and consequently, the number of heavy trucks necessary to move that 
amount of water. However, as with all other types of hydrocarbon development, the 
easiest and cheapest to develop areas generally get developed first, so as to enable faster 
realization of profit for a given drilling company. One should expect that, moving 
forward, the amount of water necessary to drill and frack new wells will increase. This 
will entail greater volumes of water and equipment, and consequently greater damage to 
infrastructure. 
 
  
                                                        
71 This constant was developed by the GAO, and published in a 1962 report 
(“EXCESSIVE”).  
  88 
Table 12. Drilling-Adjusted Vehicle Numbers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 shows that the DAVN is much larger than the number of vehicles 
registered in the respective counties. Each of the counties above shows at least ten-fold 
increases in equivalent traffic directly resulting from drilling. One would expect that, 
accordingly, infrastructure damage would likewise increase by at least ten-fold. The 
funding necessary to remediate that damage, just to maintain the status quo, must also 
increase accordingly. 
Table 13 below shows a number of separate pieces of data from which the 
necessary calculations to build this model are developed. The calculations include per car 
infrastructure spending for the four core counties, the change in per car expenditures 
between 2000 and 2007, and the unfunded damage per water volume estimate. This data 
is necessary for understanding the calculations for Table 14. 
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Table 13. Infrastructure Costs, Overfunding, and Unfunded Damage Estimates
72
 
 
The Overfunding Total represents the amount of money in dollars by which the 
State of Texas increased infrastructure maintenance expenditures between 2000 and 
2007, over the cost of inflation. This number is used to determine the amount by which 
the actual infrastructure expenditures mitigate the Unfunded Damage calculation, which 
shows the raw calculation of infrastructure damage, not controlled for actual 
infrastructure spending.  
While one might expect infrastructure expenses to increase in accordance with the 
DAVN, that has not happened. As Table 13 clearly shows, infrastructure expenses 
increased dramatically across all core counties from 2000 to 2007, but the increase is not 
enough to maintain the roads as they were prior to drilling. 
The Road Maintenance Costs (Actual) data were provided by TXDOT. The 
Necessary Road Maintenance Costs are the sum of the actual road maintenance costs and 
the Revised Unfunded Damage caused by drilling activity. The unfunded damage is 
calculated by first determining the infrastructure maintenance cost per vehicle, then 
                                                        
72
 Costs were adjusted for inflation – all calculations are made in 2007 dollars for 
comparison purposes. 
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multiplying that dollar value by the DAVN, and then adjusted based upon the actual 
maintenance funding data. The Revised 2007 Unfunded Damage is calculated by 
subtracting the Overfunding Total from the Unrevised, i.e., raw, Unfunded Damage, as 
shown in the table above.  
The product of that calculation provides a more complete assessment of the 
damage imposed by the large trucks involved in drilling on the state and local highways. 
Table 14. Road Maintenance Costs (Actual and Estimated) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While this model vastly simplifies the process of determining the precise amounts 
of damage being done, the point is that it provides a much more accurate picture of the 
magnitude of the policy concerns involved in shale gas drilling and should be considered 
a starting point for the accurate assessment of infrastructure costs associated with shale 
gas development. This model does not attempt to provide a model that addresses certain 
other complicating factors, such as increased damage to infrastructure resulting from 
previously unrepaired damage. As with many problems, unaddressed damage tends to 
compound over time, particularly as the stress in question does not abate. This is most 
certainly the case with road and highway maintenance. Oftentimes, such problems must 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This fact should not be presumed to undermine the 
baseline calculations above. Rather, those problems would serve to likely increase the 
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necessary funding for damage mitigation, since the tendency has been to allow 
infrastructure improvements and repair to go lacking. 
For example, asphalt and concrete are designed with cracks and joints 
respectively, to provide both room for expansion and improved performance under 
impact loading. As these cracks and joints degrade over time and due to increased load-
bearing, they lose their strength, resulting in faster degradation. Also, higher vehicle 
speeds and larger loads make the impact and load-bearing burden imposed upon these 
roads greater, particularly at the asphalt cracks and concrete joints.  
It should be noted that a number of factors will affect the accuracy of the 
calculations within this study. All calculations in this analysis assume that trucks carry 
standard loads according to weight; hence, there is an assumption of 80,000 pounds per 
load. However, numerous studies have found that many of the loads the trucks in 
question carry are overloaded in order to reduce transportation costs (―Institute‖). 
Overloading will cause considerably more severe damage overall to highways and roads, 
as damage incurred by highways and roads tends to increase exponentially once the safe 
operating parameters have been breached. It is very difficult to obtain accurate 
overloading information from drilling companies, as that information is not necessarily 
considered public record and the release of those data are not in the financial or political 
best interests of drilling companies. For future studies, more reliable data should be used 
to increase accuracy of analysis results. New data should become more easily accessible 
as time goes on. 
 
4.1.3 Marcellus 
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4.1.3.1 Annual well completions 
 
For the Marcellus formation calculations, the same process used to determine 
infrastructure costs in the Barnett is being used to determine a baseline and subsequently 
a projection of necessary infrastructure costs based on projected well completions.  
Table 15 shows the number of wells completed in the twenty-five counties with active 
well completions in the Marcellus formation during 2010.
73
 Counties at that point in time 
with the highest number of well completions include Washington (221), Greene (194), 
Bradford (169), Tioga (128), and Susquehanna (109). 
  
                                                        
73
 Because the Marcellus formation has only recently seen substantial development, it is 
not yet possible to compare production over time with any relevant results.  
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Table 15. Annual Well Completions (Marcellus) 
 
 
4.1.3.2 Truck trip calculations 
 
Table 16 develops an estimate of the number of trips necessary to drill and frack 
the wells in each active county, with values calculated at both 3 million and 4.5 million 
gallon estimates (low and high water volume estimates). This provides the range of truck 
trips due to drilling estimated in 2010.  
  
Allegheny 3             
Armstrong 41           
Bradford 169          
Butler 33           
Cambria 1             
Cameron 4             
Centre 12           
Clarion 6             
Clearfield 19           
Clinton 23           
Elk 6             
Fayette 87           
Forest 1             
Greene 194          
Indiana 16           
Jefferson 4             
Lycoming 37           
McKean 8             
Potter 20           
Somerset 4             
Susquehanna 109          
Tioga 128          
Warren 2             
Washington 221          
Westmoreland 75           
Source: Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection
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Table 16. Number of Drilling Truck Trips (3 and 4.5 million gallon estimates) 
 
 
4.1.3.3 Equivalent vehicle numbers 
 
Table 17 establishes vehicle equivalency figures for the two average water 
volumes. The figures in Table 17 were calculated by multiplying the estimated number of 
trips required to develop the wells sunk in the respective years (at 3 and 4.5 million 
gallons of water respectively) by the number of estimated equivalent cars, and then 
divided by 365, as in the Barnett calculations above.  
 
  
3 million 4.5 million
Allegheny 2,715               3,960               
Armstrong 37,105             54,120             
Bradford 152,945           223,080           
Butler 29,865             43,560             
Cambria 905                 1,320               
Cameron 3,620               5,280               
Centre 10,860             15,840             
Clarion 5,430               7,920               
Clearfield 17,195             25,080             
Clinton 20,815             30,360             
Elk 5,430               7,920               
Fayette 78,735             114,840           
Forest 905                 1,320               
Greene 175,570           256,080           
Indiana 14,480             21,120             
Jefferson 3,620               5,280               
Lycoming 33,485             48,840             
McKean 7,240               10,560             
Potter 18,100             26,400             
Somerset 3,620               5,280               
Susquehanna 98,645             143,880           
Tioga 115,840           168,960           
Warren 1,810               2,640               
Washington 200,005           291,720           
Westmoreland 67,875             99,000             
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection; Highway Research Board
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Table 17. Equivalent Vehicle Numbers (3 and 4.5 million gallon estimates) 
 
 
4.1.3.4 Drilling adjusted vehicle numbers 
 
Table 18 shows the numbers calculated by adding the estimated additional traffic 
resulting from shale gas development to the data provided by PennDOT related to 
registered vehicles. Both the equivalent registered vehicles (from a traffic standpoint) and 
the additional estimated damage to local and state infrastructure are shown.  
  
3 million 4.5 million
Allegheny 71,408           104,153             
Armstrong 975,912          1,423,430           
Bradford 4,022,663       5,867,310           
Butler 785,490          1,145,688           
Cambria 23,803           34,718               
Cameron 95,211           138,871             
Centre 285,633          416,614             
Clarion 142,816          208,307             
Clearfield 452,252          659,638             
Clinton 547,463          798,510             
Elk 142,816          208,307             
Fayette 2,070,838       3,020,449           
Forest 23,803           34,718               
Greene 4,617,732       6,735,255           
Indiana 380,844          555,485             
Jefferson 95,211           138,871             
Lycoming 880,701          1,284,559           
McKean 190,422          277,742             
Potter 476,055          694,356             
Somerset 95,211           138,871             
Susquehanna 2,594,499       3,784,241           
Tioga 3,046,751       4,443,879           
Warren 47,605           69,436               
Washington 5,260,405       7,672,636           
Westmoreland 1,785,205       2,603,836           
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection; Highway Research Board
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Table 18. Drilling-adjusted Vehicle Numbers and Unfunded Damage 
 
 
4.1.3.5 Costs, overfunding, and unfunded damage estimates 
 
Table 19 shows actual and estimated maintenance costs based on shale gas 
development in the Marcellus. Actual road maintenance cost data were provided by 
PennDOT. The necessary road maintenance costs are the sum of the actual road 
maintenance costs and unfunded damage caused by drilling activity. Unfunded damage is 
calculated by first determining the infrastructure maintenance cost per vehicle, then 
multiplying that value by the drilling-adjusted vehicle numbers, then further adjusted 
based on actual maintenance data. The product of that calculation provides a more 
estimated 
vehicles
unfunded
damage
estimated 
vehicles
unfunded
damage
Allegheny 777,742             6,201,198.11$        810,487    9,044,841.45$        
Armstrong 1,020,111           263,024,805.84$    1,467,629 383,638,390.83$    
Bradford 4,058,862           1,953,422,988.56$ 5,903,509 2,849,191,541.33$ 
Butler 926,385             81,978,070.59$      1,286,583 119,570,224.51$    
Cambria 112,535             5,327,606.19$        123,450    7,770,652.13$        
Cameron 98,228               75,649,463.14$      141,888    110,339,548.44$    
Centre 356,496             45,999,860.00$      487,477    67,093,718.45$      
Clarion 165,015             70,740,662.82$      230,506    103,179,751.30$    
Clearfield 498,733             127,621,954.15$    706,119    186,144,728.71$    
Clinton 568,397             494,478,457.41$    819,444    721,228,247.27$    
Elk 162,755             36,906,068.68$      228,246    53,829,846.03$      
Fayette 2,158,565           384,545,207.26$    3,108,176 560,883,617.22$    
Forest 26,849               19,347,963.92$      37,764      28,220,234.66$      
Greene 4,638,305           2,178,430,262.97$ 6,755,828 3,177,378,947.09$ 
Indiana 429,133             128,559,759.20$    603,774    187,512,576.95$    
Jefferson 121,699             32,535,004.30$      165,359    47,454,370.92$      
Lycoming 952,034             172,184,102.38$    1,355,892 251,141,453.19$    
McKean 212,988             68,045,759.32$      300,308    99,249,063.31$      
Potter 485,353             411,582,659.91$    703,654    600,319,459.75$    
Somerset 143,213             29,669,067.14$      186,873    43,274,219.47$      
Susquehanna 2,620,116           1,335,088,392.79$ 3,809,858 1,947,311,246.94$ 
Tioga 3,070,670           1,376,385,488.10$ 4,467,798 2,007,545,684.30$ 
Warren 70,141               17,644,808.85$      91,972      25,736,074.79$      
Washington 5,390,607           1,192,170,029.74$ 7,802,838 1,738,855,733.98$ 
Westmoreland 2,010,952           190,024,815.62$    2,829,583 277,163,266.98$    
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; Pennsylvania Department 
of Transportation; Highway Research Board
3 million 4.5 million
  97 
complete assessment of the damage imposed by large trucks involved in drilling on state 
and local roads.  
Table 19. Road Maintenance Costs (Actual and Estimated) 
 
4.1.4 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (discussion) 
 
It is clear from the above calculations that, while Texas has experienced 
considerably more infrastructure stress and damage than areas in Pennsylvania as a direct 
result of Barnett development, this is a temporary situation. As the Marcellus formation is 
further developed, the sheer volumes of in situ gas and the rural aspect of Marcellus 
3 million 4.5 million
Allegheny 61,339,116.40$ 67,540,314.51$      70,383,957.85$      
Armstrong 11,912,374.76$ 274,937,180.60$    395,550,765.59$    
Bradford 17,578,394.84$ 1,971,001,383.40$ 2,866,769,936.17$ 
Butler 14,704,571.94$ 96,682,642.53$      134,274,796.45$    
Cambria 19,860,283.23$ 25,187,889.42$      27,630,935.36$      
Cameron 2,397,144.54$   78,046,607.68$      112,736,692.98$    
Centre 11,412,159.96$ 57,412,019.96$      78,505,878.41$      
Clarion 10,995,736.85$ 81,736,399.67$      114,175,488.15$    
Clearfield 13,116,570.70$ 140,738,524.85$    199,261,299.41$    
Clinton 18,907,965.96$ 513,386,423.37$    740,136,213.23$    
Elk 5,152,558.85$   42,058,627.53$      58,982,404.88$      
Fayette 16,290,502.49$ 400,835,709.75$    577,174,119.71$    
Forest 2,475,929.19$   21,823,893.11$      30,696,163.85$      
Greene 9,705,381.47$   2,188,135,644.44$ 3,187,084,328.56$ 
Indiana 16,300,702.89$ 144,860,462.09$    203,813,279.84$    
Jefferson 9,051,344.55$   41,586,348.85$      56,505,715.47$      
Lycoming 13,946,167.22$ 186,130,269.60$    265,087,620.41$    
McKean 8,063,780.80$   76,109,540.12$      107,312,844.11$    
Potter 8,038,771.20$   419,621,431.11$    608,358,230.95$    
Somerset 14,958,094.92$ 44,627,162.06$      58,232,314.39$      
Susquehanna 13,182,107.31$ 1,348,270,500.10$ 1,960,493,354.25$ 
Tioga 10,805,532.81$ 1,387,191,020.91$ 2,018,351,217.11$ 
Warren 8,352,891.66$   25,997,700.51$      34,088,966.45$      
Washington 29,507,786.58$ 1,221,677,816.32$ 1,768,363,520.56$ 
Westmoreland 24,029,464.70$ 214,054,280.32$    301,192,731.68$    
Road 
Maintenance 
Costs (Actual)
Necessary Road Maintenance Costs
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation; Highway Research Board
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development will lead directly to substantially more infrastructure damage – perhaps 
orders of magnitude more damage. 
4.2 Water 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
Shale gas drilling currently requires large volumes of water. However, despite the 
volume of water needed to produce gas from shale, even at peak activity, the process may 
only account for only between 1% and 3% of total water consumption in a given area. 
More telling is the comparison between the amount of water required for drilling and the 
vast volumes of water available for use. The best estimates available show that drilling 
usage does not necessarily produce a price effect (Nickerson). This lack of a price effect 
is mostly due to the way in which water is collected for use, either through the sinking of 
private wells or purchasing water from private property owners.  
 Even in drought conditions, as happens regularly in Texas, water usage for shale 
gas development does not necessarily overtly affect available volumes of water for other 
uses. However, the simple fact remains that water is being used, and in rather large 
quantities. More importantly, companies use much of that water without any manner of 
financial remuneration to the state or, in Pennsylvania‘s case, the Commonwealth. 
Oftentimes, even when companies compensate property owners for water usage, the price 
paid does not accurately reflect the economic value of water, and certainly does not factor 
the cost of remediation for potential spills or surface- or groundwater pollution. If for no 
other reason than for the potential for water pollution, some accounting of those facts 
should be taken. Moreover, since water is a communal resource, the potential for 
assigning real economic value should be considered.  
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4.2.2 Barnett 
 
4.2.2.1 Number and type of well 
 
Large amounts of water have been used to develop the Barnett shale formation. 
Estimates of water usage for all drilling and fracking in the Barnett are as high as 2% of 
the total water used in this region.
74
 While such relatively small percentages of water do 
not sound like a serious threat to the Texas water supply and generally will not have a 
measureable effect upon the cost of water, the activities that require this water have the 
potential for destroying water sources – particularly if the activity is pursued without 
proper care – creating the potential for even percentage use as comparatively small as 
what shale gas development represents to be large enough to alter the overall cost of 
water. 
As of September 2010, the month with the highest number of active wells on 
record, drilling and extraction companies have drilled a total of at least 14,891 wells, the 
vast majority of which were horizontally drilled and fracked. It is assumed that some 
previously active wells had fallen out of production, and other active wells may have 
been drilled vertically.
75
  This should not greatly affect the total amounts of water 
necessary for development.  
 
                                                        
74
 According to Chesapeake Energy, one of the primary companies operating in the 
Barnett and Marcellus shale formations, this data was acquired from a 2006 report from 
the Texas Water Board and a study conducted in 2007 by Dr. Peter Galusky of the 
environmental consulting firm, Texerra, and commissioned by the Gas Technology 
Institute (―Water Management‖).  
75
 The hydraulic fracturing process generally requires many times more water to develop 
a well than the more traditional vertical technologies. Since the vast majority of wells 
drilled in the Barnett since 2000 have been horizontally drilled and hydrofracked, one can 
assume that substantially more water has been employed in the gas development than 
would have otherwise been the case had only vertical drilling technology been used.  
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4.2.2.2 Gas volume per well 
 
As of December 2010, the average Barnett well has produced approximately 
554,347.96 MCF of natural gas.
76
 At that point in time, the Barnett represented the most 
actively fecund shale gas formation in the world. While this is due mostly to the Barnett 
formation representing one of the first shale gas developments in the world, the amount 
of natural gas being produced in the Barnett is not insignificant. 
4.2.2.3 Water volume per well 
 
Using an average volume of water of 4.5 million gallons per well,
77
 the total 
amount of water necessary to perform the drilling in the Barnett formation total over 67 
billion gallons (67,009,500,000).  
 
 
 
                                                        
76
 This figure was calculated by dividing the total volume of natural gas extracted from 
active Barnett wells from January 2000 to Dec 2010 by the number of wells in production 
as of December 2010. As stated above, some wells certainly have fallen out of 
production, while others have come online during the period in question. The calculation 
above is simply a thumbnail calculation to determine overall per well production. 
77
 According to a Chesapeake Energy factsheet, a typical shale gas well requires 
approximately 250,000 gallons of water for the actual drilling, and another  
3.8 million gallons per well to perform the fracing process itself. Other companies may 
use more or less depending upon the specifics of their processes. Other sources within the 
industry put the estimated total water usage per well above 4.5 million gallons. It should 
also be noted that every additional frac stage requires additional water, and the amount of 
water necessary to perform a successful frac depends heavily upon on a number of 
factors, not least of which is the thickness of the formation itself, which varies by 
location. Typically, companies will drill in the easiest, most accessible, and cheapest 
locations first. Later, the more difficult, deeper, denser, less profitable areas will be 
developed. This also extends to water usage, as it typically requires more water as 
complications in drilling are added. According to another Chesapeake factsheet, the 
company claims to only use approximately 3.5 million gallons of water during the 
fracking process. A third factsheet (July 2010) claims that 5 million gallons of water are 
needed to drill and hydraulically fracture a shale gas well. The various numbers should, 
more than anything, illustrate the wide estimates provided by various private companies 
regarding their operations (―Barnett Water Use‖, ―Water Management‖). 
  101 
4.2.2.4 Water usage – municipal sources 
 
Natural gas drilling companies often purchase water from municipal sources 
(―Water Use Fact Sheet‖). While this does not necessarily affect the overall amount of 
water available underground, it can affect the total amount of water available from 
surface municipal sources, and can have an effect on the overall amount of water 
produced. When using municipal water sources, gas companies pay according to volume 
used. Due to price breaks made available for commercial/industrial users and at higher 
levels of consumption/use, gas companies do not typically pay for water at a rate 
commensurate with residential users. Still, there exists a distinct financial interest for gas 
companies to not pay for water usage if at all possible. 
4.2.2.5 Flowback water disposal/containment 
 
In the Barnett play, most flowback is removed from the well site by water tanker 
trucks. The flowback water is then typically injected into underground salt caverns that 
function as disposal wells.
78
 Some water gets reused immediately or recycled for later 
use. According to the TRRC, the estimate for recoverable volume of injected frack water 
is approximately 70%, leaving around 30% in the ground (―Water Use in the Barnett‖). 
According to Nicot and Potter, ―[a]bout 30% of the injected water returns without too 
much of a quality decrease, whereas the remaining 40% is more degraded.‖ These are 
average statistics and can vary greatly from well to well, based on the local 
characteristics of the formation as well as the standard operating procedures of a given 
producer. 
                                                        
78
 According to Chesapeake Energy‘s website, the company injects unusable flowback 
water into a deep underground geological formation called the Ellenburger formation, a 
porous rock formation that rests beneath the Barnett formation (―Barnett Shale 
Production‖).  
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Table 20. Barnett Play Water Usage Estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 20, the estimates of water usage were based upon establishing a range (based 
on average water estimates provided by Chesapeake‘s public releases and the Tarrant 
County League of Women Voters).  Recycling water (represented by the ―recycling 
rate‖79 in the table) can have a significant impact on the total amount of water employed 
for shale gas development.  As recycling becomes more efficient and cost-effective, it is 
expected that usage of recycled water will increase.  
4.2.3 Marcellus 
 
4.2.3.1 Number and type of well 
 
Between 2008 and 2010, natural gas operators drilled a total of 2,349 Marcellus 
shale wells in Pennsylvania (―PermitDrilledmaps‖). The vast majority of these wells were 
                                                        
79 The recycling factor is based upon official statistics released by Chesapeake. 
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drilled horizontally and therefore used substantially greater volumes of water than 
vertical or conventional wells. 
4.2.3.2 Gas volume per well 
 
As of December 2010, the average Marcellus well produced approximately 
318,380.81 MCF. While there is a substantial difference between the gas per well 
produced in the Barnett and Marcellus plays, this can be explained by the length of time 
each respective play has been actively producing natural gas. While the Barnett has 
produced almost 250,000 MCF more per well, the play has also been active for eight 
more years. All indications in the Marcellus actually point to a much greater per-well 
extraction volume over the lifespan of each well when compared to the Barnett play.  
4.2.3.3 Water volume per well 
 
Using an average volume of water of 4.5 million gallons per well, the total 
amount of water necessary to perform the drilling in the Marcellus up to the end of 2010 
totals over 10 billion gallons (10,570,500,000 gallons).  
4.2.3.4 Water usage – municipal sources 
 
To date, most water used for hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus has been from 
surface sources. While some operators have obtained water from municipal sources, the 
nature of the Marcellus play itself – primarily rural, with many available surface water 
sources in Pennsylvania  – operators can typically collect most of the water needed for 
the extraction process without using municipal sources. 
4.2.3.5 Flowback water treatment 
 
Since Pennsylvania has no underground formation equivalent to the salt caverns 
in the Barnett, flowback water is primarily hauled by tanker truck to sewage plants for 
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treatment and discharge into rivers, or until recently to injection wells in northeastern 
Ohio. Both options have been documented as potentially threatening, because of issues 
with water contamination and microquakes.
80
 
Table 21. Marcellus Play Water Usage Estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (volume) 
 
As of December 31
st
, 2010, a total of 533,132,080.9  MCF
81
 had been extracted 
from the Marcellus formation. By comparing this data to the Barnett data, the Marcellus‘ 
first two years is on par with the initial years of Barnett production. In May 2000, total 
Barnett production stood at 200,106,145 MCF, with a monthly production of 5,864,695 
                                                        
80
 The New York Times reported extensively on the concerns of radioactivity in drinking 
water and the inability of sewage plants that accept drilling waste for treatment to test and 
properly treat flowback water. Pennsylvania is also the ―only state that has allowed 
drillers to discharge much of their waste through sewage treatment plants into rivers‖ 
(Urbina). 
81
 The DEP data, amounting to releases by 55 of 73 operating companies currently active 
in the Marcellus, provided no unit of measurement for the volume. However, assuming 
the data provided adheres to the industry standard, MCF, the data make sense. 
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MCF. Production within the Barnett shale formation began back in 1993, at which time 
the only production came from vertical wells.  
It is more appropriate to look at data from the point at which companies had 
developed more advanced techniques for shale gas extraction. Considering extraction 
volume data from January 2000 onward, the point at which the Barnett reached the level 
of extraction rates comparable to the Marcellus is November 2001.  At this point the 
monthly extraction in the Barnett had reached 13,520,365 MCF, from 1266 active wells.  
4.2.5 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (Active wells)  
 
As of September 2010, a total of 2,349 wells have been drilled (or spud) in the 
Marcellus, 1,454 of which have been active, with a total of 533,132,080.9 MCF gas 
extracted (―Marcellus Shale Production‖). Based on the estimate of the volume of water 
needed to frack a well in the Marcellus
82
, approximately 10.57 billion gallons of water 
should have already been used, in some capacity. This estimated water volume does not 
account for water that has been treated or cleaned for reuse. The number of wells drilled 
so far represents approximately 10% (9.764%) of the number of Barnett wells that are 
currently operating, which stands at 14,891 at its peak in September 2010.  
Assuming the Marcellus experiences identical well development activity, one 
would expect volumes approaching the numbers discussed above as the total gross 
amount of water to be used.  
The numbers above do not tell the entire story. When the Barnett was producing 
at the level of the Marcellus, there were approximately 76 inactive wells in Barnett as of 
November 2001, out of a total of 1246. That leaves 1174 active wells, or 5.77% of 
                                                        
82 Based on using 4.5 million gallons per well. 
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Barnett wells being essentially either inactive or not ready for full-time production. By 
comparison, at the same point in the Marcellus, 1454 wells have been spud, but only 872 
wells reported activity, and 240 of those reporting zero production. While the well 
numbers happen to be comparable, the active wells are not. Thus, while the number of 
wells spud may be 1454, the actual number with any real extraction is 632, or 43.5% of 
the wells. 
4.2.6 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (Gas volume)  
 
Since the average Marcellus well will require between 3 and 4.5 million gallons to 
perform a successful frack, and if the number of wells only meets the number of wells 
drilled in the Barnett, the estimated volume of water may be as high as 44,673,000,000 
gallons, or slightly more than 44 billion gallons. While this estimate will likely be on the 
low end, such a high volume of water may have dramatic effects upon localities.  
The above numbers provide a vastly different perspective on production and 
water usage. Therefore, while the per well production average in the Barnett at the 
comparable volume was 170,448.16 MCF, the total per well production average for 
active Marcellus wells is much higher, at 318,281.62 MCF. Therefore, the average 
Marcellus well looks to be producing at close to twice the volume that the Barnett wells 
are producing.  
As it stands currently – as of the 2010 release of drilling activity – the Marcellus 
seems to be using not just less water per well, but is producing considerably more gas per 
well and per gallon of water used.
83
 In the Barnett, for comparable volumes, 
                                                        
83 This is probably due, in large part, to recycling and – more importantly – refracking in 
the Barnett. In the Marcellus formation, little refracking has been performed since it is 
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approximately 5,607,000 gallons of water were used. That equates to around 37.88 MCF 
of natural gas produced per gallon of water used. This estimate is arrived at by dividing 
the total gas volume produced by the product of active wells and average water usage per 
frack job in the Barnett. For the Marcellus, the numbers diverge greatly. Using the same 
equation, the result is 106.1 MCF per gallon of water used.  
Undoubtedly, these proportions may change. The differences between the 
Marcellus and Barnett production could be a function of the effects of newer and better 
technology. However, it is clear that the Marcellus formation looks to be a considerably 
richer play.  
4.2.7 Water cost projections  
 
Table 22 projects the estimated water costs in the Marcellus – Pennsylvania only 
– based upon the current market water rates charged by Pittsburgh Water and Sewer 
Authority (PWSA)
84
 for industrial usage.  It should be noted that Pittsburgh charges less 
for industrial uses of water than for either residential or commercial uses. According to 
PWSA rates, there is a minimum charge for metering for anything above 548,000 gallons, 
$4,501.14 (―Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority‖). While drilling companies in the 
Marcellus have generally refrained from using municipal water sources (because 
Pennsylvania has an abundance of surface water sources), this calculation determines the 
market value of the water being used, regardless of sourcing. For all volumes above 
548,000 gallons, the rate, as seen in the table below, is $7.26 per thousand gallons. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
such a relatively new play. The Barnett, by comparison, is a mature play, the production 
of which having already peaked. 
84
 PWSA rates were used for illustration purposes only. Rate information was readily 
available and it was assumed that the largest population center in the portion of the state 
affected by the Marcellus formation would provide a reasonable estimate of the market 
costs of water. 
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This projection uses the estimated average of 4.5 million gallons of water to frack 
each Marcellus well, plus the 500,000 gallons needed to drill each well, in order to 
determine the projected cost per well. This projection also includes cost estimates based 
on various recycling percentages of the overall water usage. With technology in this area 
improving over the next few years, one should presume that companies would seek to 
recycle as much water as possible, particularly if there is some monetary cost attached to 
the initial water extraction.  
If the companies already drilling in the Marcellus were to pay for the water 
extraction estimated by this model, the potential for producing offsetting monies for 
related externality costs could be considerable. As shown in Table 22, the cost for water 
per well ranges from $18,585.57 (50% recycling) to $37,171.14 (no recycling). By 
multiplying the number of wells that have been drilled by the various per-well water costs 
at the various recycling rates, the unpaid compensation for water used for drilling and 
fracking through December 2010 ranges from $43,657,503.93 (50% recycling) to 
$87,315,007.86 (no recycling).
85
 Imposing market costs upon water usage would 
presumably create a financial incentive for both improving the fracking process (using 
less water overall), and improving the recycling process (pushing for more efficient and 
more effective processes).  
  
                                                        
85
 These calculations are in current dollars (not adjusted for inflation). 
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Table 22. Estimated water costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23 projects water usage and costs for the entire Marcellus gas formation, 
based on previous experiences in the Barnett formation. According to the most recent 
projections for extractable gas volumes in the Marcellus, a range is given, labelled High 
estimate and Low estimate. The high estimate is based partially on the Engelder/Lash 
projection, upon which all of Considine‘s projections were based. The lower estimate is 
based on a number of other more conservative estimates. The final extractable volume 
likely will fall somewhere between these two numbers. While the range does not offer 
enough precision for longer term planning, the projections provide at least a starting point 
from which policymakers can further understand what the Commonwealth may be facing 
in the coming months and years. 
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Table 23. Projected Water Costs (Marcellus) 
Based on these projections for the number of wells necessary, and combining 
those estimates with the estimates with the amount of water necessary to drill and frack 
those wells, a range for the estimated volume of water needed to develop the entire 
Marcellus formation has been calculated. The projections again factor in recycling at both 
30% and 50%. Therefore, based on these estimates, Pennsylvania can expect water usage 
to range from 1,126,385,899,000 (1.126 trillion) gallons to 4,238,994,262,000 (4.238 
trillion) gallons.  
Using the PWSA rate calculations from the table above, and combining those 
with the water usage estimates for the entire Marcellus within the state, the aggregated 
costs being carried by the Commonwealth that should require compensation in some form 
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are calculated. There is a range, as with the above projections, based upon recycling rates, 
as well as with the high and low extraction volume estimates. The range is from 
$8,373,809,591,560.00 ($8.373 trillion) to $31,513,649,836,960.00 ($31.513 trillion), 
over the entire extraction life of the Marcellus formation within Pennsylvania. This 
sounds like a substantial amount of money, particularly if viewed as an up-front expense 
for drilling companies. Instead, however, it makes greater sense to consider these values 
over the life of the entire development of the Marcellus. In the worst case scenario – 
assuming it requires a total of 5 million gallons of water to drill and frack each well – the 
cost to a given drilling company will be $37,171.14 per well. According to some sources, 
it currently costs between $5.0 and $6.4 million to fully develop a well (―Marcellus Shale 
– Well Cost‖). If these numbers are accurate, even in the worst-case scenario of no 
recycling, paying for water usage will only increase the cost per well by between 
0.5808% and 0.7434%.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusions (Policy Recommendations):  
5.1 Introduction 
 
The importance of preventing serious problems associated with extractive 
industries in general, and shale gas development in particular, necessitates a change in 
policy moving forward. While the impediments may seem difficult to surmount in the 
current political environment, the current situation provides policymakers a unique 
opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of others: namely, Texas, Alaska, 
West Virginia, Norway, Azerbaijan, and Russia.  
By forging a new path with a pragmatic set of policies that the Commonwealth 
can adapt from other states and nations, Pennsylvania can pre-emptively address many of 
the complications that will arise from shale gas development. This proactive stance will 
also establish a certain precedent for any future extractive industries.  
It is also critical to recognize that Pennsylvania is a policy trailblazer in the realm 
of shale gas development. Pennsylvania lawmakers must work to establish clear, 
equitable, and functional policies to circumscribe shale gas development, both to 
accurately represent the needs of the Commonwealth and act as a model for other states.  
These policy recommendations should not be misconstrued as anti-shale gas – 
shale gas can and should factor greatly into a comprehensive state and national energy 
plan. However, this discussion must include the potential negative externalities associated 
with shale gas development, and provide for adequate remediation and preventative 
measures.  
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5.2 Policy Recommendations 
5.2.1 Issue 
 
Pennsylvania has tremendous underground natural gas resources in the Marcellus 
shale formation (as well as the underlying Utica formation), the development of which 
will produce substantial policy complications for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
Those complications will include, but not be limited to: budgetary issues, particularly 
infrastructural degradation and water pollution remediation; and microeconomic effects, 
namely localized inflation, sectoral inflation.   
Based on the experiences of other states and nations whose economies rely upon 
extractive industries, Pennsylvania will likely encounter numerous problems that require 
foresight and planning to mediate. 
5.2.2 Policy Options 
 
 The most appropriate and effective way to address the complications arising from 
extractive industries is to consider the problem holistically. Each of the following policy 
recommendations is important to mitigate the associated problems, and will help to 
equalize the benefits in a more equitable manner. In addition, proactively addressing 
problems before they arise makes future problems easier to address, and will end up with 
less difficulty when dealing with them.
86
  
 
 
 
                                                        
86 Since we have already witnessed substantial problems in the Barnett – and even in the 
Marcellus, despite being a relatively new development – it makes good sense to address 
both past problems and future problems that can be predicted with almost perfect 
certainty. 
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5.2.2.1 Recommendation #1 
The Commonwealth should establish and properly and sufficiently fund a shale 
gas fund modeled upon natural resource funds already in place in states and nations 
whose economic development is closely tied to or dependent upon extractive industries.  
This is the most critical alteration to current policy. Such a fund will provide the 
public means to address both short- and long-term problems associated with shale gas 
development, as well as provide a template for dealing with future extractive industries.  
Since the Dutch Disease/resource curse problems are both well-documented 
phenomena associated with extractive industries, it seems only prudent to address such 
problems proactively. There are many other associated externalities that are not currently 
addressed, yet present profound and sustained complications for citizens affected by gas 
drills. By creating a fund, the purpose of which is to directly mitigate these problems – be 
they budgetary or microeconomic in nature – the Commonwealth can then remove these 
problems from the political arena, making the subsequent identification of such problems 
primarily bureaucratic.   
Moreover, since it is clear that the user fees assessed by Pennsylvania upon 
drilling operators are insufficient to fully address the problems associated with shale gas 
development, this recommendation provides the Commonwealth with a way to provide a 
socially beneficial outcome that should, for all intents and purposes, pay for itself. 
Furthermore, the gas fund must avoid the problems that other states and nation-
states have encountered. It makes sense operationally to establish this fund 
constitutionally, like Alaska has, while at the same time removing all funding streams 
and persistent accumulated funds from the omnibus budget of the Commonwealth. This 
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will eliminate the possibility of future lawmakers succumbing to political and financial 
expediency by mortgaging the future needs the gas fund is intended to address. Since this 
fund is designed specifically to address problems associated with shale gas development, 
it must be stressed that decisions for all expenditures from the fund must be outside the 
purview of the legislative body once the fund has been established.  
5.2.2.2 Recommendation #2 
The source of financing for the fund mentioned above should be tied directly to 
shale gas extraction, and should be a combination of per-well fees as well as a 
comprehensive severance tax on total volumes of natural gas extracted. By applying up-
front charges per well for infrastructure degradation and water usage based upon the 
models in Chapter 4, the fund will have sufficient capital to both address problems 
proactively and to address and react to problems as they develop. 
As mentioned above, the gas fund must be sufficiently funded in order to provide 
appropriate mitigative assistance where needed. Therefore, the source of financing for the 
fund must be tied directly to shale gas extraction. The only way to do this fairly is to 
create a funding structure based on a combination of per-well fees and a comprehensive 
severance tax on total volumes of natural gas extracted. By applying up-front charges 
similar in practice to user fees per well for infrastructure degradation, and water usage 
based upon the models provided in Chapter 4, the fund should have sufficient capital to 
both address problems proactively and to address and react to problems as they develop. 
Since the issue of a severance tax has been shelved indefinitely by Governor Tom 
Corbett, it remains questionable whether such a scheme could be successfully 
implemented in the near future, particularly in light of the effectiveness of the industry 
  116 
lobby. Pennsylvania remains the only state in the country with a substantial, currently 
active natural gas extraction operation and without some form of severance tax. Once 
Pennsylvanians begin to observe the scale of associated negative externalities caused by 
shale gas development, it stands to reason that Pennsylvanians will agitate for the 
application of such a tax. While this approach in precludes the ability to proactively 
address many problems, the likelihood of a tax being applied most certainly increases.  
5.2.2.3 Recommendation #3 
 The Commonwealth should require that all water usage for shale gas 
development must be paid for according to fair market value, via volume fees for all 
water usage. Policymakers should also recognize that innovation can be fueled and 
fostered by way of proactive policies that enforce new market realities upon specific 
actors. By charging drilling companies for all water used in the fracking process, the 
Commonwealth will essentially create a financial incentive for operators to develop new 
and less water-intensive processes, including, but not limited to,  better recycling 
technology or water-free fracking technology.  
Operators should pay fair market value to the state for the privilege of using 
Pennsylvania water supplies. By taking this approach, the Commonwealth will be 
directly fostering innovation in the realm of water treatment, as well as providing more 
funding for potential remediation efforts associated with shale gas extraction. By 
charging drilling companies for all water used in the shale gas drilling process, the 
Commonwealth will establish a financial incentive for operators to develop new and less 
water-intensive processes, including, but not limited to, better recycling technology and  
water-free fracking technology.  
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5.2.3 Rationale and Implementation 
 
Such policy alterations are based on the experiences observed during the 
development of the Barnett formation, as well as preliminary indications from initial 
activity in the Marcellus formation. As companies develop more wells with current 
technology,  ever-greater volumes of water will be needed, and further road degradation 
will occur, exacerbated both by well development in primarily rural areas and the 
temperate climate of the region. Moreover, it should be noted that these issues should not 
be presumed to represent all potential, or even likely, negative associative effects 
stemming from shale gas development. Therefore, policies and funding options must be 
of sufficient size to allow for addressing such unforeseen or expected negative 
externalities. 
The question remains, how can a gas fund contribute specifically to some of 
these negative impacts in ways that a severance tax or usage fee won’t? There are a 
number of different types of natural resource funds, each with their own purpose 
and function. Alaska’s fund, for example, is controlled by the state legislature, and 
functions much like a pension, whereby every Alaskan receives a yearly 
disbursement. Contrast that with the Azerbaijani fund, designed essentially as an 
earmark for the benefit of future generations. And of course, there are other funds – 
stability funds – like in Norway, wherein the purpose is to provide sufficient 
revenue for a central budget in case the overall value of hydrocarbons changes 
dramatically, thereby negatively affecting royalties, upon which the national budget 
relies.  
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In Pennsylvania, as mentioned above, there exists no severance tax and 
hence, no statewide budgetary reliance on royalty income. Furthermore, while there 
is a tradition of viewing the mineral wealth beneath the feet of Pennsylvanians as a 
nominally communal resource for benefit of the commonweal, the truth is that the 
way in which modern capitalism manifests itself in the United States downplays 
such communitarian notions of collective wealth, and thus there remains little 
motivation to impose such paradigm upon the natural gas industry.  
In addition, Pennsylvania benefits from being a component of a much larger, 
much more deeply and widely diversified economy whereby many of the more 
troubling economic concerns associated with extractive industries – namely the 
Dutch disease and resource curse, characterized by a generalized inflation – would 
seem to be less of a problem.  
Yet, many undeniable complications do present themselves. As made clear by 
the research presented earlier in this work, those problems will manifest in areas 
least likely to possess the capability to address them in any meaningful, effective 
way. Thus, Pennsylvania will be forced to set a new precedent, whereby the state 
borrows liberally from the funds that work, and dispose of the aspects of these 
funds that would not only be inappropriate for Pennsylvania policy issues, but could 
potentially lead to larger problems down the road.  
Hence, the establishment of the gas fund in Pennsylvania should focus on the 
mechanics of how the fund is to operate - specifically, how the fund is managed, how 
the disbursement of money from the fund will be carried out, and how its ability to 
satisfy particular social problems can be distinguished from a tax or fee.  
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While insulating the domestic economy in Pennsylvania from the flow of 
hard currency does not present itself as a necessarily notable problem, the 
multitude of other attendant problems which would necessitate the creation of such 
a fund provides ample justification for establishing a fund that works, on the local 
level, as a stabilization fund.  
Paradoxically, the Pennsylvania Gas Fund should have at once a very broad 
and yet a very narrow mandate. On the one hand, the fund should have the latitude 
to address problems that have not yet been identified but that may manifest 
themselves as development of the shale reserves proceeds. On the other, the fund 
must be sufficiently constrained, by state legislative mandate, so that the function of 
the fund focuses only on localities negatively affected by the shale development, 
either directly or indirectly.  
Ideally, the fund would require a separate bureaucracy that would focus 
primarily on tracking development of the shale gas reserves and the attendant 
effects that manifest as that development increases. The aim of such a separate 
bureaucracy would be to insulate the fund from arbitrary political power struggles 
and cronyism – problems that would fundamentally undermine the entire purpose 
of the fund. The best way to successfully endeavor to do something along these lines 
would be to elicit the help of various institutions of higher learning in the 
Commonwealth, the interest of which is public service and the pursuit of knowledge 
for the benefit of society at large. Not only would leveraging universities reduce 
overhead, the fund would be able to synergistically partner with universities in such 
a way that the state can develop its own class of specialists.  
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Hence, with adequate funding, proper oversight, a premium placed upon 
both independent research and the public good – both for the function of the fund 
itself and for policy consistency moving into the future, the Pennsylvania Natural 
Gas Fund would prove to be an effective and efficient arbiter of the potential 
problems and solutions related to shale gas development throughout the state.  
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Chapter 6: Future Work 
 
Following the investigations described in this thesis, a number of projects could 
begin, involving both the models established in Chapter 4 as well as the creation of new 
models. While this work should not be presumed to be comprehensive, this work opens 
the door for future research in the realm of other externalities. This research addresses 
only two discrete components of budgetary and microeconomic effects of shale gas 
development, and explores a well-established effective solution for those problems. 
One of the main attendant effects of shale gas development that was not addressed 
is housing prices, particularly localized prices in ‗hot‘ areas. One of the problems lies 
with insufficient data sources to explore the problems. However, with proper funding and 
a sufficient time horizon, many of these difficulties could be remedied.  
Another effect of concern is sectoral inflation, particularly as it relates to the labor 
market. As noted in Chapter 2, one of the major problems in other nations particularly is 
the deindustrialization of certain regions as a direct result of extractive industries. While 
this problem has been explored in other nations to some degree, it remains to be seen 
whether any research has been pursued in the United States directly relating to extractive 
industries. This goes beyond mere boom/bust cycles. Rather, the economic incentives on 
the part of laborers tends to drive this particular trend.  
While this is a small portion of the potential research opportunities that shale gas 
development provides, this short list provides substantial research options moving 
forward.  
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